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I. INTRODUCTION
Mark Twain’s famous remark, “The report of my death was an ex-
aggeration,”1 has become most apt in recent years as it pertains to the
purported demise of the rule of caveat emptor in real estate transac-
tions.  An ancient maxim of law, caveat emptor puts a buyer on his
guard to discover defects in things purchased, with no general duty by
a seller to disclose defects of which he has knowledge.2  Despite the
apparent abrogation of the concept by legislative and judicially-im-
posed-disclosure obligations, a new phenomenon has emerged that al-
lows a seller of real property, or related real property services, to
easily maneuver around the requirement of disclosure through strate-
gic, rent-seeking conduct.
Disclosure obligations intervene in contract relations, as they alter
the incentives and burdens of the parties in discovering information
material to the bargain.3  The oft-occurring occasion for the law’s in-
tervention into private bargains is incompleteness that results from
the costs (e.g., negotiating, research, and verification) of contracting
for all possible contingencies.4  Rational actors will weigh these costs
against the benefits of contracting to a theoretical, if not practical,
completeness.  Where the contract is not complete, default rules—gap
fillers—may operate.  The most significant gap filler in contract rela-
tions is the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. This obli-
gation serves as an overarching contract term and cannot be
contracted away.5  The law seeks to enforce the parties’ expectations,
1. Frank Marshall White, Mark Twain Amused, N.Y.J., June 2, 1897, at 1.
2. See, e.g., Swanson v. Baldwin, 85 N.W.2d 576, 578 (Iowa 1957) (“‘[P]urchaser
must examine, judge, and test’” an article for himself, “‘being bound to discover any
obvious defects’”) (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 294 (3d ed. 1933)); Dorsey v.
Jackman, 1 Serg. & Rawle 42, 44 n.(a) (Pa. 1814) (“[I]t is the business of the buyer to
be upon his guard” and “must abide any loss of any imprudent purchase”).  The ori-
gins, contours, and abrogation of the maxim are discussed in Part III of this Article.
3. See Jules J. Coleman, Douglas D. Heckathorn & Steven M. Maser, A Bargain-
ing Theory Approach to Default Provisions and Disclosure Rules in Contract Law, 12
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 637, 650, 693 (1989).
4. See Harold Dubroff, The Implied Covenant of Good Faith in Contract Inter-
pretation and Gap-Filling: Reviling a Revered Relic, 80 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 559, 576
(2006) (“[C]ourts, whether implicitly or explicitly, and regardless of their jurispruden-
tial philosophy . . . acknowledge the impracticality (due to transaction costs) and the
impossibility (due to the limits of human imagination . . .) of producing an all-encom-
passing, express agreement.”); Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Con-
tract Law, 74 OR. L. REV. 1131, 1147 (1995) (“The assumption that most parties in
fact reduce their entire agreement to a single, perfectly accurate writing [is] . . .
unrealistic.”).
5. The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing aims to ensure the accom-
plishment of these expectations of the party. See Nemec v. Shrader, 991 A.2d 1120,
1126 (Del. 2010) (en banc) (noting that the implied covenant is invoked to “imply
contract terms when the party asserting the implied covenant proves that the other
party has acted arbitrarily or unreasonably, thereby frustrating the fruits of the bar-
gain that the asserting party reasonably expected.”); Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas.
Co., 878 A.2d 434, 444 (Del. 2005) (en banc) (“The implied covenant . . . requires that
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induced by their mutual promises, but recognizes that there are cer-
tain understandings or expectations the parties should not need to ne-
gotiate, e.g., the other party will not act to prevent the enjoyment of
the fruits of the contract.6
However, incompleteness as to the terms of the bargain is not the
only occasion for legal intervention.  Instead, strategic, rent-seeking
conduct, i.e., the withholding of information so as to increase a party’s
share of the total gains from the transaction, should, but not always,
mediate disclosure obligations.  The case of Teer v. Johnston shows
what happens without intervention.7  After a county-road project that
included the diversion of water, the seller’s property was constantly
flooded.8  Unable to obtain compensation from the government for
the diminution in value to her property, the seller opted to recoup
those losses through a sale of her property.9  The offering price did
not reflect the effects of the flooding problem because the seller did
not reveal that information.10  While the sale was “as is,” the seller
represented orally, as well as in a property condition disclosure state-
ment, that there were “no flooding, drainage[,] or grading problems”
with the property and that the property had never flooded.11  The con-
tract did not by its terms incorporate the disclosure statement.  It did
contain a clause that stated, “No representation, promise, or induce-
ment not included in this contract shall be binding upon any party
hereto.”12  The Alabama Supreme Court rejected the buyers’ claims
of fraud, finding the disclaimer-of-reliance clause negated the re-
quired element of reliance.13
What the seller practiced in Teer was contract by ambush, animated
solely by self-interest.  One contemplating a real property transaction
will enter into a myriad of contracts, e.g., the purchase and sale agree-
ment, inspection, title search, appraisal, and survey, among others.
These relationships are, for the most part, self-interested.  Indeed,
“self-interest” is often identified as the critical component of success-
[each party to a contract] act in a way that honors the [other’s] reasonable expecta-
tions.”); Moran v. Erk, 901 N.E.2d 187, 190 (N.Y. 2008) (“The implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing . . . embraces a pledge that ‘neither party shall do anything
which will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other party to
receive the fruits of the contract.’”) (quoting 511 W. 232nd Owners Corp. v. Jennifer
Realty Co., 773 N.E.2d 496, 500 (N.Y. 2002)).
6. Katz v. Oak Indus., Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986) (citing COLIN
KELLY KAUFMAN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 570 (Kaufman Supp. 1984)).
7. Teer v. Johnston, 60 So. 3d 253 (Ala. 2010).
8. Id. at 255.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. Johnson claimed that she was instructed to fill out the disclosure form this
way by the real estate agent and that she expected him to ensure the form reflected
what the agent knew about the property.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 261.
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ful markets as a morally positive force.14  Rational choice theory ex-
plains human behavior as the product of rational choices, particularly
in an economic context, and states that people are essentially self-in-
terested utility maximizers.15
Although formally bilateral, these contracts may have effects on
third parties who contemporaneously or subsequently rely on the
promises in them.16  In this original relation, neither party consciously
does what is abstractly right when entering into the contractual rela-
tionship.17  Instead, throughout history the overarching political and
economic driving force behind contractual relations has been self-in-
terest facilitated by the philosophy of freedom of contract, and with
the requirement of privity serving as the line of demarcation for a
wrongdoing party’s liability.18  That meant downstream purchasers
had no cause of action against a remote seller who engaged in unscru-
pulous conduct that caused injury down the line.19
This Article hopes to make evident two trends seemingly in conflict.
The first trend is toward raising the standards of probity and veridical-
ity in contractual relations toward greater accountability and liability
on market actors operating outside traditional bounds. The first is ex-
pressed by new rules that: require good faith and fair dealing between
parties;20 ensure sellers are obligated to disclose material facts about a
property otherwise unavailable to buyers;21 and make wrongdoing
14. See DANIEL FINN, MORAL ECOLOGY OF MARKETS: ASSESSING CLAIMS
ABOUT MARKETS AND JUSTICE 46–56 (2006) (challenging the morality of self-interest
in markets and identifying the moral limits). See also Robert C. Solomon, Free Enter-
prise, Sympathy, and Virtue, in THE MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VAL-
UES IN THE ECONOMY 16, 17 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008); or see discussion infra Part II.B.
15. See John N. Hooker, The Moral Implications of Rational Choice Theories, Car-
negie Mellon U., Tepper Sch. Bus. 1–2 (2011), http://repository.cmu.edu/cgi/viewcon-
tent.cgi?article=2390&context=tepper (“[Rational choice theories] have been a major
part of the Western intellectual landscape since the market system replaced a medie-
val economy.  This historical shift is seen as giving rise to Homo economicus—eco-
nomic man—who is driven by self-interested economic calculation rather than a value
system of loyalty and honor.”).
16. See discussion infra Part V.
17. FINN, supra note 14, at 55; Harry N. Scheiber, Economic Liberty and the Mod-
ern State, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 149–50 (Harry N. Scheiber ed.
1998).
18. Arthur L. Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J.
1008, 1008 (1918) (“To many students and practitioners of the common law privity of
contract became a fetish. As such, it operated to deprive many a claimant of a remedy
in cases where according to the mores of the time the claim was just.”).
19. See W. DAVID SLAWSON, BINDING PROMISES: THE LATE 20TH CENTURY REF-
ORMATION OF CONTRACT LAW 12–13 (1996).
20. See Duboff, supra note 4, at 615.
21. See Johnson v. Davis, 480 So. 2d 625, 629 (Fla. 1985) (“[W]e hold that where
the seller of a home knows of facts materially affecting the value of the property
which are not readily observable and are not known to the buyer, the seller is under a
duty to disclose them to the buyer.”); Van Camp v. Bradford, 623 N.E.2d 731, 736
(Ohio Com. Pl. 1993) (discussing a then-recently enacted Ohio statute requiring “a
seller of residential property to provide each prospective buyer . . . with a prescribed
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parties liable to non-parties who foreseeably relied on the wrongdo-
ers’ contractual undertakings.22  This trend promises to avert injury,
achieve efficiency, and seems to accord with society’s evolving notions
of fairness.
The second trend, exemplified in Teers, counters the first.  Because
humans are innately self-interested, entrepreneurs (and rascals) have
devised techniques to avoid these new levels and kinds of exposure to
potential liability for non-disclosure and to non-parties.  They have
employed market and contract strategies that purport to shift to the
other party the onus of uncovering the truth—which might be buried
under layers of misrepresentations and that limit non-parties’ right to
rely on contract promises.  The effect is to enable a market actor to
contract away liability for intentional wrongdoing by the simple ex-
pedients of “as is” and “disclaimer-of-reliance” clauses—the result in
Teers.  This is troubling in a number of respects.  First, the clauses
undercut the fundamental character of enforceable contracts being
the product of free will.  Indeed, the first requirement of contract for-
mation is a meeting of minds.  Fraud, ostensibly camouflaged by dis-
claimers, negates the unknowing party’s free will.  Second, such
liability-avoidance techniques, although ostensibly consistent with the
contracting parties’ free will, disturb the markets because of the exter-
nalities.  Absent the truth about the quality or condition of the prop-
erty, buyers enter into transactions, or pay too much for property
unsuitable, or useless, for its intended purpose.  Undisclosed defects
present the potential for injury to third parties. A buyer’s costs of in-
spection and discovery are greater than a seller’s costs of disclosure.23
disclosure form regarding various aspects of the property” intending to disclose all
material matters).
22. See Petrillo v. Bachenberg, 655 A.2d 1354, 1357 (N.J. 1995) (relaxing the priv-
ity requirement for third party suits against attorneys, finding an attorney’s duty to a
non-client third party depends on a balance of several factors); Credit Alliance Corp.
v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 483 N.E.2d 110, 118 (N.Y. 1985) (applying a “near-privity”
test imposing liability on accountants to non-contractual third parties based on an
evaluation of certain factors); H. Rosenblum, Inc. v. Adler, 461 A.2d 138, 147–53
(N.J. 1983) (abandoning strict privity and finding accountants may be liable to any
person who the accountant could reasonably have foreseen would obtain and rely
upon the accountant’s opinion), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-25
(West 2014), as recognized in Cast Art Indus. LLC v. KPMG LLP, 36 A.3d 1049,
1052–53 (N.J. 2012); Grgic v. Cochran, 689 S.W.2d 687, 690 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (find-
ing a subcontractor owes no duty to the owner of the project on which he works in the
absence of privity); A. E. Inv. Corp. v. Link Builders, Inc., 214 N.W.2d 764, 767, 769
(Wis. 1974) (holding that a tenant may not recover against an architect for building
design defect due to lack of privity).  In the case of new homes, see, e.g., Richards v.
Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 429–30 (Ariz. 1984); Blagg v. Fred Hunt Co.,
612 S.W.2d 321, 323–24 (Ark. 1981) (rejecting the imposition of a privity requirement
and allowing remote purchasers to maintain a cause of action against a builder).
23. In other words, they offend well-settled notions of efficiency in contract rela-
tions.  Under one meaning of efficiency, Pareto Efficiency, an exchange is efficient,
where it is voluntary—entered into in the absence of fraud or duress—and both par-
ties are made better off, in their own estimation, by virtue of the exchange, each party
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Lastly, the exploitative use of these clauses disturbs our sensibilities,
offends the law’s conscience, and debases not just the parties, but soci-
ety at large.
Courts’ responses to these opportunistic maneuvers have been dis-
parate.  Some courts enforce the clauses without much hesitation, fo-
cusing on the venerable values of freedom and certainty of contract,
chastising buyers for their gullibility.24  Others categorically outlaw
the clauses, expressing consternation at conduct that seems abjectly
fraudulent and exploitative.25  Yet others appear to be inclined to up-
hold agreements that are freely entered into, although these courts
take a case-by-case approach, making fine distinctions based on sub-
tleties in the clause’s language, which might allow an injured party
relief.26
These trends must be examined in context, historical and contempo-
rary, to determine whether they reveal a rational response to the self-
interested choices of contract participants and whether these re-
sponses must be bolstered to ensure that responsibility for unrealized
expectations or harm is fairly allocated among the parties.  In the end,
this Article proposes that disclaimer-of-reliance clauses should be pre-
sumptively unenforceable, as they offend current market morality and
public policy.
Part II will trace the evolution of thought on market transactions
and contracting.  Part III discusses the shift in thinking about contract.
Part IV reviews limits on contracting imposed by law and policy.  Part
V discusses the imperative of the law’s conscience, outlining a frame-
work for evaluating disclaimer-of-reliance clauses.  This Article ends
with conclusions and comments on how legal relations have, and must,
change in the interests of fairness and efficiency in real estate markets.
II. SOCIETAL ORDERING THROUGH CONTRACT
In this part of the Article, the Author explores the phenomenon of
“contract” as a device for social and economic ordering and considers
how the prevailing conception of contract explains or justifies the
law’s intervention to relieve a buyer of contractual obligations in a
particular circumstance.  That circumstance being: A buyer signs a
writing disavowing the existence of and any reliance upon parol repre-
sentations by seller when in fact neither was the case.  It is useful to
begin with a discussion of the articulated views on legal thought in the
early 18th to early 19th centuries.
having valued that which they acquired in the exchange more than that originally
held. See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW IN A MARKET CONTEXT: AN INTRODUCTION
TO MARKET CONCEPTS IN LEGAL REASONING 189–90 (2004).
24. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
25. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
26. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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The 18th century was the age of revolutions: intellectual, scientific,
political, and industrial.27  The Industrial Revolution, most significant
for the discussion here, “broke out” sometime in the 1780s.28  It was
the first time in “human history that the shackles were taken off the
productive power of human societies, which henceforth became capa-
ble of the constant, rapid, and . . . limitless multiplication of men,
goods, and services.”29  Why in the 1780s?  The historian E.J. Hobs-
bawm believed the government’s embrace of private profit and eco-
nomic development made the times propitious.30
This focus on the material world emanated from the emerging em-
brace of rationalism and secular thought.  The use of reason, rather
than tradition and religion, was employed to gauge and understand
human relations.31  Natural phenomena would be understood by sci-
entific observation and interpretation.32  The individual, rather than
God or state, seeking to maximize his own well-being, emerged as the
center of the world.33  Society and social relations came to be defined
not by religious precepts, but by the voluntary, calculated relations—
contracts.34
A. Governmental Deference to Market Forces
As national and international commercial markets emerged, the
rhetoric of laissez-faire required the government to stay out of private,
economic decision-making as a general matter.35  The laissez-faire the-
ory rested upon the writings of Adam Smith who claimed that it was
the unimpeded operation of free-market forces that best promoted
economic growth and provided the happiest result, even though tem-
27. See ERIC HOBSBAWM, THE AGE OF REVOLUTION 1789–1848 at 263–64 (1996).
28. Id. at 28.  Hobsbawm explains, “This is now technically known to the econo-
mists as the ‘take-off into self-sustained growth.’” Id.
29. Id. at 45.
30. Id. at 48–49.  The greater part of the century, for most of Europe, was a period
of prosperity and comfortable economic expansion. Id.  During this period, Adam
Smith’s Wealth of Nations was a guide to the economists of the era. Id. at 237.
31. Id. at 235, 278.  The American and French revolutions embraced these beliefs.
Id. at 261.
32. See id. at 278–79.
33. See id.
34. See id. at 176.
35. ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 391–92, 395–96, 509, 512, 651,
743–74 (2005), www2.hn.psu.edu_faculty_jmanis_adam-smith_wealth-nations.pdf
[hereinafter ADAM SMITH]; see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Law and Morals in Classi-
cal Legal Thought, 82 IOWA L. REV. 1427, 1436 (1997). J. M. KELLY, A SHORT HIS-
TORY OF WESTERN LEGAL THEORY 242 (1992).  Smith thought the basis of this
natural order was the social division of labor, and that it could be proven scientifically
that the existence of a class of capitalists, who owned the means of production bene-
fited all, including the labor class who worked under them. Id. It was thought that
the “increase in the wealth of nations proceeded by the operations of property-own-
ing private enterprise and the accumulation of capital, and it could be shown that any
other method of securing it must slow it down or bring it to a stop.” Id.
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porary hardship might be experienced.36  The idea was that if society
removed artificial restraints and restrictions from men, then the ap-
proximately equal, natural powers among them would assert them-
selves, and unregulated-contract formation would mean equality and
justice.37  Government regulations should be relaxed, leaving the de-
velopment of trade to individual action.38  Thus, each individual, in
seeking his own advantage, actually promoted the advantage of the
country as a whole.39  Smith thought “humanity consisted essentially
of sovereign individuals of a certain psychological constitution pursu-
ing their self-interest in competition with one another.”40  Economists
embraced Smith’s views believing that these activities, if left un-
checked, would produce a social order that was organic and naturally
evolved, as opposed to one that was prescribed and constrained by
religion, and thus operated to improve overall well-being.41  The legal
historian Herbert Hovenkamp assessed the prevailing view as one
where markets were “natural” and “self-executing,” needing govern-
mental intervention only rarely.42  This view constrained the state
from intervening in private economic affairs.43  Modern adherents of
freedom of contract stress economic efficiencies44 that enable goods
and services to move from less to more valuable uses and to those who
value them more highly.45
B. The Sweetness of Commerce: Doux Commerce
An economic philosophy devoid of all moral constraints would de-
base social relations and cause the deterioration of those foundations
necessary for political society. Those lacking the economic or intellec-
tual wherewithal to navigate markets safely were the most vulnerable
to harm in a world where moral compunctions were absent.46 Because
36. See generally ADAM SMITH, supra note 35; see also KELLY, supra note 35, at
306.
37. RICHARD T. ELY, 2 PROPERTY AND CONTRACT IN THEIR RELATIONS TO THE
DISTRIBUTION OF WEALTH 475, 604 (1922).
38. W. F. OAKESHOTT, COMMERCE AND SOCIETY 242 (1936).
39. ADAM SMITH, supra note 35, at 363–64, 512; see also HOBSBAWM, supra note
27, at 235.
40. HOBSBAWM, supra note 27, at 237. As explained below, this self-interest did
not mean the absence of regard for the other.  The capacity for “sympathy” was a trait
that defined humans as much as “self-interest.” See supra text accompanying notes
24–31.
41. Id. at 237.
42. Hovenkamp, supra note 35, at 1435–36.
43. HOBSBAWM, supra note 27, at 239.
44. See Benjamin E. Hermalin, Avery W. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law,
in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW & ECONOMICS 3, 66 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell
eds., 2007).
45. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 79 (3d ed. 1986); ROBERT
B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE MARKETS AND
PUBLIC CHOICES 4 (6th ed. 1999).
46. KELLY, supra note 35, at 265.
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commerce was viewed as a positive, civilizing force, the concept of
doux commerce emerged as mediation.47  The belief was that
“[c]ommerce . . . polishes and softens (adoucit) barbaric ways . . . .”48
Thomas Paine expressed the view that “[commerce] is a pacific sys-
tem, operating to cordialise mankind, by rendering Nations, as well as
individuals, useful to each other”49 and commerce teaches a man to
“deliberate, to be honest . . . [and] prudent.”50
Even Adam Smith described commerce as an activity based on vir-
tue and integrity,51 a conception of human nature quite at odds with
the self-interested model that is so often attributed to him.52  Instead,
it may have been Immanuel Kant who was responsible for banishing
kindly sentiments from moral philosophy.53 In Kant’s view, morality
was learned by rational deduction.54  Smith believed that compassion
for others, not pure self-interest, was the essential component of thriv-
ing markets.55
Although Smith assessed the world and its imperatives in the 18th
century when commerce emerged as organized, deliberate activity, his
views were yet thought to be well suited for the 19th century, when
business had become the great civilizing influence in Europe.  A dec-
ade of war from 1805 to 1815 had quietly changed into a century of
peace and prosperity.56  As a new era dawned, the perpetual wars
over religious principles, claims to the throne, and land had been re-
placed by a new world of business that promised civil compromise and
unimagined wealth.  Entrepreneurs, merchants, and bankers
reigned.57
47. Albert O. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations of Market Society: Civilizing, De-
structive, or Feeble?, 20 J. ECON. LIT. 1463, 1464 (1982) [hereinafter Hirschman, Rival
Interpretations].
48. 2 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS 1, 8 (3d ed. 1762).
49. THOMAS PAINE, THE RIGHTS OF MAN 92 (1792), http://www.classicly.com/
books/17912/download_and_add_to_library/pdf.
50. Hirschman, Rival Interpretations, supra note 47, at 1465 (citing SAMUEL RI-
CARD, TRAITE´ GE´NE´RAL DU COMMERCE 463 (1781)).
51. See ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS ¶ I.I.1 (1759), http://
www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smMS1.html [hereinafter MORAL SENTIMENTS].
52. Solomon, supra note 14, at 17.  Adam Smith claimed that sympathy or “fellow-
feeling” is a “natural” moral sentiment.  Like his good friend David Hume, Smith
defended a rather broad practical notion of utility.  But, Adam Smith can best be
understood as a follower of Aristotle, whose philosophy embraced the belief that self-
interest at its extreme (pleonexia or “grasping” self-interest) was a perversion, that is,
as not natural and not itself definitive of human nature.  Instead, in Aristotle’s view,
what defined human nature, was the capacity for virtue, a desire for excellence. Id. at
18; see also MORAL SENTIMENTS, supra note 51.
53. IMMANUEL KANT, THE GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 13
(trans. H. J. Paton 1964) (1785); see also Solomon, supra note 14, at 18.
54. Solomon, supra note 14, at 18; KANT, supra note 53, at 13.
55. KANT, supra note 53, at 13.
56. Solomon, supra note 14, at 16.
57. Id.  In fact, Hirschman speaks of the embrace of self-interest during the rise of
commercial society as a superior alternative to the passions, such as inherited animos-
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III. TRANSMOGRIFICATION OF CONTRACT LAW: FROM EQUITABLE
CONCEPTION TO WILL THEORY
Prevailing economic thought carried over and informed the legal
sphere—in particular, contract law.  At first, contract law was largely
conceived as a matter of natural law: promises were enforced because
they were morally binding and shaped to some extent by canon law on
what promises were binding in conscience.58  This was the equitable
conception of contract.  A contract was enforced if it was reasonable
and fair.  It was viewed as a fair exchange59 and evaluated on the basis
of substantive fairness. Underlying this equitable conception of con-
tract was the principle that a “sound price warrant[ed] a sound com-
modity.”60  This meant the parties had impliedly agreed that the
quality of the goods sold was impliedly equal the price paid.61  How-
ever, as the Industrial Revolution took hold, transforming a predomi-
nantly fixed, land-based economy into a more fluid and enterprising
one involving goods developed for market exchange based on money
or credit, commerce moved away from the mores of the manor and
feudal village to the imperatives of competition in the world.  Adam
Smith’s central tenet was that an individual’s pursuit of selfish eco-
nomic gain would benefit society because by serving himself, he also
serves society.  This is so because the entrepreneur must offer goods
and services that the public values and demands and thus the pursuit
of self-interest coalesces precisely with the public interest.62  Conse-
quently, the individual needed to be free to act and all obligations
would arise out of the free will of the individual.63
Under the laissez-faire regime, restraint of market activities or par-
ties by the government was positively anathema to prosperity.64  Indi-
viduals were invested with the capacity to determine what best served
ities and desire for glory that had before dominated public life. See generally ALBERT
O. HIRSCHMAN, THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS: POLITICAL ARGUMENTS FOR
CAPITALISM BEFORE ITS TRIUMPH (1977).
58. ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 143 (1982).
Natural law can be expressed as embracing the “idea of deduction from the nature of
man as a moral creature and of legal rules and legal institutions which expressed this
ideal of human nature.” Id.
59. Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87
HARV. L. REV. 917, 941 (1974).
60. Id. at 926.
61. However, 18th century natural law theory was not successful in incorporating
the Roman idea of “just price,” that “where a sale had taken place for a price far
below the object’s real value, the vendor ought to have a chance to rescind or have
the price topped up . . . .” KELLY, supra note 35, at 266.  Instead, the view came to be
that the parties should be free to make their own bargains, the principle of freedom of
contract being seen as one of natural law. Id.; see also MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780–1860 at 180 (Stanley N. Katz ed., 1977).
62. ADAM SMITH, supra note 35, at 363–64, 512.
63. Id.
64. See generally Morris R. Cohen, The Basis of Contract, 46 HARV. L. REV. 553
(1933).
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their own well-being.65  Additionally, a buyer was charged with know-
ing that he lacked complete information in order to make a wise deci-
sion and act accordingly.66  This was the “will theory” of contract.67
The will theory fit with a philosophy that emphasized ego and indi-
vidual-human will as the basic facts of human life, and inevitably, the
cardinal importance of individual freedom.68  This was the case for
two reasons: the human will was inherently deserving of respect,69 and
the free expression of will was essential to societal progress.70  Since
the manifestation of human wills formed the basis of contract, human
will became the source of all the terms of the contract,71 as well as the
source of the implied terms which might be read into a contract.72
Thus, while the equitable conception limited and sometimes denied
contractual obligation by reference to the fairness of the underlying
exchange,73 in contrast, the will theory held that contract obligation
stemmed from the convergence of wills in which equitable considera-
tions had no sway.74  During this era, the law rejected the intervention
of equity into contractual relations because it would introduce arbi-
trariness and uncertainty.  Moreover, any attempt to interfere with the
express terms of the contract was paternalistic, depending upon the
will and caprice of the judge in the interests of justice.75  Conscience
obliged one to perform even the burdensome, improvident bargain.76
Contract was part of a system of social order77 resting upon the in-
terchange of free choices by members of society, in pursuit of both
egotistical and altruistic ends.  To accomplish this essential function in
65. Id. at 575; see also Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of
Private Autonomy: Lon Fuller’s “Consideration and Form”, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94,
126, 131 (2000).
66. Cohen, supra note 64, at 575.
67. Id.
68. Samuel Williston, Freedom of Contract, 6 CORNELL L.Q. 365, 366 (1921).
69. Cohen, supra note 64, at 575.
70. Horwitz, supra note 59, at 161.
71. This proposition seems to call for an accommodation of views on account that
in the realm of contracts, the element of will is inevitably bound up with law, yet “the
law as part of a larger world must be regulated and determined by the nature of the
larger order of which it is a part.”  Cohen, supra note 64, at 568.  It is also the case that
the law imposed obligation upon parties even when it was most impossible to find any
expression of will.  Indeed, “[t]here is never a moment of time when the two parties
are actually in agreement or of one mind.  Yet no one denies that the resulting rights
and duties are identical with those called contractual.” Id. at 576.
72. Id. at 576–77.
73. Horwitz, supra note 59, at 164.
74. Id.; see also JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY PLEADINGS AND THE
INCIDENTS THEREOF: ACCORDING TO THE PRACTICE OF THE COURTS OF EQUITY OF
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 329 (Isaac F. Redfield ed., 8th  ed. 1870); Cohen, supra note
64, at 562; Kennedy, supra note 65, at 97.
75. Horwitz, supra note 59, at 161.
76. Id. at 160–61.
77. MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 141 (1951) [hereinafter COHEN & COHEN].
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social ordering, subject to narrow limits, the principle was that law
would delegate power to the contracting parties to devise their own
rules as they related to rights and responsibilities over the matter con-
tracted for.78  As far as the parties are concerned, the law of contracts
was of their own making—society merely lent its machinery of en-
forcement to the party injured by a breach.79 The impact of the adop-
tion of the will theory was substantial.  Judge Joseph Story explained:
[E]very person who is not from his peculiar condition under disabil-
ity is entitled to dispose of his property as he chooses, and whether
his bargains are wise and discreet or profitable or unprofitable or
otherwise are considerations not for the courts of justice but for the
party himself to deliberate upon.80
Judge Story’s stern views were not accepted without criticism. Ros-
coe Pound and Richard Ely, in protesting against the will theory,
pointed out that if contract left the parties to protect their own inter-
ests the contract must mirror the disparities in the ability to protect
them.81  The idea that the standards of fairness belong to the very in-
stitution of contract—an idea that jurists had defended for centuries—
seemed to have vanished from the face of the earth.82  For Ely and
Pound, the result was “that contract, taken in itself, was inherently
impossible to reform.  The terms of a contract must necessarily reflect,
not justice, but power.  Therefore, the state must intervene to protect
people from contract.”83
A. The Imperatives of Freedom of Contract: Markets and Morals
The views of Ely and Pound were not universally embraced.  In-
stead, the predominant beliefs were that contract was the product of
will, and free choice operated as a means of social integration and
social ordering.84  Freedom to contract on whatever terms served indi-
vidual self-interest and would promote the progress of society—mak-
ing available wanted commodities and keeping prices down through
competition.85  The general belief was that persons of full age and
competence should have the greatest freedom in contracting and that,
while force and fraud would justify interference by the law, it was not
the function of the law to strike down or relieve a party from a bad or
78. Cohen, supra note 64, at 562.
79. Although it could not be said that a contract between two individuals was
always devoid of all public interest, if there was none, why enforce it? Id. at 562.
80. James Gordley, Contract, Property, and the Will—The Civil Law and Common
Law Tradition, in THE STATE AND FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 66, 85 (Harry N. Scheiber
Ed. 1998) (quoting J. Story, Commentaries 1:337).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 83.
83. Id. at 85.
84. COHEN & COHEN, supra note 77, at 142.
85. Cohen, supra note 64, at 562–63.
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improvident bargain.86  However, this proposition was questionable in
that it rested upon the fallacy that parties to a contract stood on equal
footing and were thus capable of taking measures for the protection of
their own interests.87 While the 18th-century belief was that economic
man was not without sympathy,88 that sympathy did not seem to ap-
preciate the capacity of man to do evil. Inequality concerns in eco-
nomic society that flowed naturally from the varying capacities of
humans were dismissed.89  The thinking was that markets would im-
prove conditions for all, since they operated on the basis of the ex-
change of equivalents—so many hours of labor for so many dollars.90
While laissez-faire theory sought to characterize government regu-
lation as evil, it ignored a huge point—it forgot that “not only industry
but also the whole of life of civilization depend[ed] on the feeling of
security that the protection of government or organized community
afford[ed].”91  Orthodox-American thought was preoccupied with the
“liberty of contract in economic matters, but could readily approve
serious intervention with the liberty of contract when morals were at
stake.”92  Yet, the thinkers during this classical period employed a nar-
row definition of the “moral sphere.”93  It did not extend to paying an
honest and decent wage or limiting the required hours of work.94  So
too, it did not extend to requiring honesty and full disclosure between
parties in a seemingly “arm’s length” transaction.95
B. Contract Will and Caveat Emptor
The “will theory” as it operated in the laissez-faire market regime
provided the foundation for the rapid adoption of caveat emptor,96 the
apotheosis of the 19th-century individualism.97  As human relations
86. Id. at 563.
87. Id.; see also Kennedy, supra note 65, at 118, 124.
88. See text accompanying notes 48–52.
89. ADAM SMITH, supra note 35, at  309–10, 330–31.
90. Id.; see also HOBSBAWM, supra note 27, at 281–82.
91. Cohen, supra note 64, at 559.  Cohen points out that the philosophy of free-
dom or liberty illustrated one of the most pervasive and persistent vices of reasoning
on practical affairs, i.e., “the setting-up of premises that are too wide for our purpose
and indefensible on their own account.” Id.  It was fallacious reasoning to conclude
that because some oppressive restraints were bad, that the absence of all restraints
was a good thing. Instead, while agreements and promises should be enforced to en-
courage reliance upon them, and thus provide market security, nonetheless, some-
times, the law must intervene and go beyond the original intention of the parties in
recognition of the general effects of classes of transactions. Id. at 592.
92. Hovenkamp, supra note 35, at 1444.
93. Id. at 1446.
94. Id. at 1436.
95. See discussion infra text accompanying notes 92–96.
96. COHEN & COHEN, supra note 77, at 180.
97. PATRICK S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 464
(1979) (“[D]octrine of caveat emptor can be said to represent the apotheosis of the
nineteenth century individualism . . . .”).
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played out in the world, notions of justice and virtue played little or
no role in human affairs.  The powerful and cunning took advantage
of the weaker and gullible and then described as law and justice
whatever they had laid down in their own self-interest.98  To be sure,
the law at that time did not tolerate misrepresentations or fraud in
commercial dealings, but it also did not require a seller of goods or
real property to disclose all that the seller knew, which would enable
the other party to get a better or even honest bargain.99  A buyer was
imprudent when the buyer did not learn the worth or value of the
thing negotiated for through an independent investigation, inquiries to
the seller, or by obtaining warranties.100
1. Every Man for Himself and Devil Takes the Hindmost
Even as caveat emptor was embraced, the law’s intolerance of fraud,
having very definite moral undertones, persisted.101  Yet, the task of
discerning the point when a seller’s silence rises to the level of fraud
has never been an easy one.  In an 1834 work entitled A Series of
Letters to a Man of Property, Edward Burtenshaw Sugden illustrates
the moral ambiguities in the vendor/vendee relationship in the form of
a witty letter to a client.102  He writes:
I will not argue with you, whether in selling an estate you are
bound in conscience to disclose all its defects to the purchaser.
Moralists, as you know, agree that a seller is bound to do so, al-
though the principle has been controverted.  I shall content myself
with stating how the law on this subject stands.
If the person to whom you sell was aware of all the defects in the
estate, of course he cannot impute bad faith to you in not repeating
to him what he already knew; neither will you be liable, if you were
yourself ignorant of the defects.  And even if the purchaser was, at
the time of the contract, ignorant of the defects, and you were ac-
quainted with them, and did not disclose them to him, yet he will be
without a remedy, if the defects were such as might have been dis-
covered by a vigilant man . . . .
If, however, you should, during the treaty, industriously prevent
the purchaser from seeing a defect which might otherwise have eas-
98. Brian Leiter, Holmes, Economics, and Classical Realism, in THE PATH OF THE
LAW AND ITS INFLUENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 292 (Ste-
phen J. Burton ed. 2000).
99. See generally Dorsey v. Jackman, 1 Serg. & Rawle 42 (Pa. 1814).
100. Until the 18th century, the tendency of courts was to apply the maxim caveat
emptor to all types of contracts, but during that century, the idea grew that warranties
could be implied to a broader category than those discussed infra, first in relation to
title and later, and less completely, in respect of quality.  13 SIR WILLIAM SEARLE
HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 69–70 (2d ed. 1937).
101. Bell v. Harrison, 102 S.E. 200, 204 (N.C. 1920).
102. EDWARD BURTENSHAW SUGDEN, Letter IV, in A SERIES OF LETTERS TO A
MAN OF PROPERTY ON THE SALE, PURCHASE, LEASE, SETTLEMENT, AND DEVISE OF
ESTATES (Philadelphia, Farrand and Nicholas 1834).
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ily been discovered—for example, if you carefully conceal from him
the necessary repairs of a wall to preserve the estate from the sea
. . . the contract would not bind the purchaser either at law or in
equity.
So, if there is a latent defect in your estate, of which you are
aware, and which the purchaser could not by any attention whatever
possibly discover, you are bound to disclose it to him . . . . [But if]
you warrant a house to be in perfect repair, and he knew that it was
without a roof or windows, he cannot object that the property does
not agree with the description of it . . . .
Thus I have told you what truths you must disclose.  I shall now
tell you what falsehoods you may utter in regard to your estate.  In
the first place, you may falsely praise, or, as it is vulgarly termed,
puff your property; for our law, following the civil law, holds that a
purchaser ought not to rely upon vague expressions uttered by a
vendor at random in praise of his property . . . . Besides value con-
sists in judgment and estimation, in which many men differ.  But if
you should affirm that the estate was valued, by persons of judg-
ment, at a greater price than it actually was, and the purchaser act
upon such misrepresentation, you could not enforce the contract in
equity.103
Sugden’s description of the law of vendor and purchaser reveals the
tension between the rule of the marketplace, which can be brutish and
harmful, and the rule of conscience, which requires regard for the
well-being of others or at least avoidance of deliberately harmful acts.
In his mind, a seller of real property could set aside the moral require-
ments so far as his conscience would permit, needing only respond to
the law’s requirements.  The parties otherwise had to take care that
the deal was as they hoped, with little expectation of interference by
the law.104
103. Id. at 23–28. See also Gustafson v. Rustemeyer, 39 A. 104, 106 (Conn. 1898)
(holding that “a mere false representation as to the value of real property knowingly
made by the seller to the buyer, is not actionable, unless the buyer has been fraudu-
lently induced to forbear inquiry as to its truth”); Williams v. McFadden, 1 So. 618,
620 (Fla. 1887) (explaining that assertions concerning the value of land, or its condi-
tion and adaptation to particular uses—which are only matters of opinion and esti-
mates as to which men may differ—are the usual and ordinary means adopted by
sellers to obtain a high price and are understood to not afford buyers any ground for
failing to make inquiries for the purpose of ascertaining the real condition of the
property); Parker v. Moulton, 114 Mass. 99, 100 (1873).
104. Buyers were held to the duty of learning of the precise location and dimen-
sions of the property they were acquiring. See, e.g., Lytle v. Bird, 48 N.C. 222, 224
(1858); but see Elliot v. Boaz, 9 Ala. 772, 776–77 (1846) (holding vendor induced ven-
dee to purchase land, by showing lands other than those conveyed. The court held
that vendee need not have a survey conducted, but was entitled to rely upon vendor
and obtain relief in equity against a claim by the vendor for the purchase price); Post
v. Liberty, 121 P. 475, 480 (Mont. 1912) (holding a seller liable even though he did not
know of the falsity of his representations—but should have known).  In Post, the
court also relied upon a statement by Judge Story that:
[w]hether the party, thus misrepresenting a material fact, knew it to be false,
or made the assertion without knowing whether it were true or false, is
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2. Unquestioned Soundness
Caveat emptor was believed to be a necessary principle for gov-
erning market transactions during its heyday.  In fact, so firmly had
the doctrine become embedded in the law that many courts merely
recited the principle without much questioning of its fairness or valid-
ity.105  The theory was that:
The law redresses those only who use diligence to protect them-
selves.  Such diligence as prudent men ordinarily use.  The quality of
land, on which its value depend[ed], and which [was] too various for
a market standard, the purchaser [could] see, if he [would] but look.
And the course that prudence has established, requires that he
should look.106
The morality of a seller’s failure to make disclosures to the buyer was
not reviewed as it would burden commerce to require “the vendor [to]
see for the purchaser. It is enough for him, in point of law, that he
does not conceal the knowledge of secret defects nor give a warranty,
express or implied.”107  Thus, it was up to the buyer to extract repre-
sentations and warranties from the seller if he was to be protected in
the deal.108  The logic behind this position is clear.  Who better to
know her requirements, to inspect and assess the risks and value, than
the buyer?109  If equity were to intervene, it would change the bargain;
thus obviating the parties’ wills.110
Caveat emptor was said to be one of the best-settled maxims of the
land.111 Some courts even found it was not consistent with moral con-
duct, yet could not resist its application,112 instead identifying many
wholly immaterial; for the affirmation of what one does not know or believe
to be true is equally, in morals and law, as unjustifiable as the affirmation of
what is known to be positively false.  And even if the party innocently mis-
represents a material fact by mistake, it is equally conclusive; for it operates
as a surprise and imposition upon the other party. (emphasis added).
1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE § 193 (1835) (emphasis
added).
105. See, e.g., Whitmore v. Orono Pulp & Paper Co., 39 A. 1032, 1036 (Me. 1898)
(explaining that caveat emptor is the rule and any change is for the legislature).
106. Sherwood v. Salmon, 2 Day 128, 136 (Conn. 1805) (holding sale of land repre-
sented as “good, arable land, of an excellent quality” with “good timber . . . wholly of
bottom land, fit for all agricultural purposes, without any waste or broken land”
proved false as the land contained no bottom land, but rocks and inaccessible moun-
tains, and never was of any value).
107. Id.
108. Wolbert v. Lucas, 10 Pa. 73, 74 (1848); Barnard v. Kellogg, 77 U.S. 383, 388
(1870).
109. See DAVID A. THOMAS, THOMPSON ON LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
§ 99.06(a)(3)(D); Barnard, 77 U.S. at 397; Wolbert, 10 Pa. at 74.
110. Wolbert, 10 Pa. at 74.
111. Lamar’s Ex’r v. Hale, 79 Va. 147, 159 (1884).
112. See, e.g., Bean v. Herrick, 12 Me. 262, 266 (1835) (pointing out the difficulty of
reconciling cases in which “[s]ome have been more indulgent to fraud and misrepre-
sentation, than is consistent with morals, or the common sense of mankind”); Bryan v.
Primm, 1 Ill. 33, 34 (1822) (holding silence may be “moral fraud . . . [b]ut this moral
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positive values from it—“leading to vigilance and circumspection and
serv[ing] to check litigation.”113  Only a few courts even ventured to
discuss the wisdom or philosophical foundations of the doctrine.  But
the views of the judges’ of one court, in Dorsey v. Jackman, who did
engage in that discussion, although feeling bound to follow the maxim
by the principle of stare decisis, are worthy of comment here.114
There the purchaser sought the return of monies paid on the purchase
of a piece of real property.115  After the purchase, the purchaser dis-
covered defects in title, which seller did not disclose at the time of
contracting.116  The court ruled that where no warranty was involved,
it must be supposed that the parties took the defects into considera-
tion when agreeing on the purchase price.117  Therefore, in the ab-
sence of fraud, the purchaser is without relief.118
A concurring judge pointed out the differences between the civil
law and the common law.  Under civil law, the seller of either real or
personal property was obliged to inform the buyer of all the defects of
the subject property and was responsible to him for any defect; even
those not known at the time of sale.  In contrast, the common law,
evolving and adjusting as human affairs demand,119 did not encompass
a rigid rule of morals that might be ill-suited to the circumstances.120
Rather, it:
happily reconciles the claims of convenience with the duties of good
faith, by requiring the purchaser to apply his attention to those par-
ticulars, which may be supposed within the reach of his observation
and judgment, and the vendor to communicate those particulars and
defects which cannot be supposed to be immediately within the
reach of such attention: and even against his want of vigilance the
purchaser may provide, by requiring the vendor expressly to war-
rant the property sold.121
The judge went on to explain the court was “not at liberty to re-
move the settled landmarks of property, although individually we may
be dissatisfied with the policy of particular parts of the system, or their
abstract justice, when applied to special cases, which may forcibly
fraud has not yet grown into a legal fraud.  In cases of this kind there may be circum-
stances which cause this moral fraud to be a legal fraud, and give the buyer his action
on the implied warranty, or on the deceit”).
113. See, e.g., Bean, 12 Me. at 269; see also Warden v. Eichbaum, 14 Pa. 121, 126
(1850).
114. Dorsey v. Jackman, 1 Serg. & Rawle 42, 42 (Pa. 1814).
115. Id. at 47.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 48.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 51.
120. Id.
121. Id.
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strike our minds.”122  The judge felt “bound to acquiesce in its
provisions.”123
A third judge took a more conciliatory stance and an expansive
view of the court’s role and of the concept of fraud, which would viti-
ate any contract.124 He found that the purchaser was “a simple man,
dealing with one whom he took to be of superior information in mat-
ters of land title, and in whose integrity he had reposed confidence.”
Given the inherent risks in taking a conveyance by a tax-sale deed,125
it was a manifest fraud and an imposition for a speculator knowingly
to convey a defective title as a good one to this honest and unsuspect-
ing buyer.126
This court’s indulgence but rejection of a plea to overrule a judge-
made rule even where it is revealed to produce unjust results is troub-
ling.  It cannot be explained by the need to further reliance by future
contracting parties on the existing state of the law because the costs to
the injured parties are too great. That the existing law was good be-
cause it furthered other interests, such as facilitating commercial
transactions, could not outweigh the unfairness to parties who are un-
sophisticated and unknowledgeable about the law and how the courts
would interpret it.  Law failed when it sanctioned and provided cover
for what was tantamount to fraudulent or arguably immoral conduct.
Of equal concern is a court that felt so constrained by rules that went
against reason that it did not seek to accommodate fairness. If the
common law was essentially what the judges declared, evolving over
time and with circumstances, the reluctance to circumscribe caveat
emptor in egregious cases was inexplicable.
3. Foreclosing Will by Fraud
Even so, fraud per se, that is, involving affirmative false state-
ments,127 was still held to vitiate any contract, and caveat emptor
would not shield a seller where fraud was established.128  Indeed, one
court spoke for many that “[i]t would be a sorry administration of
justice that would sanction . . . palpable fraud by crying caveat
122. Id.
123. Id. at 53.
124. Id. at 54–55.
125. Id. at 54.  The greatest risk is the possibility of the sale being set aside because
of irregularities. Id. at 55–56.
126. Id. at 56.
127. Fraud is said to involve an affirmative statement of material fact, made with
knowledge of its falsity or disregard for its truth, with the intent that the person to
whom made rely on it, reliance that is reasonable and injury.  Schnuck v. Kriegs-
hauser, 371 S.W.2d 242, 246–47 (Mo. 1963); Lowther v. Hays, 225 S.W.2d 708, 713
(Mo. 1950). See also 77 AM. JUR. 2d Vendor and Purchaser § 57.
128. See, e.g., Griel v. Lomax, 5 So. 325, 326 (Ala. 1889); Tobin v. Bell, 61 Ala. 125,
128 (1878).
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emptor.”129  The transactions of business, trade, and commerce could
not be conducted with that facility and confidence, which are essential
to successful enterprise, and the advancement of individual and na-
tional wealth and prosperity without reasonable reliance on the integ-
rity of representations made in bargaining.130 Thus, a party commits
manifest fraud and violates rules of equity, when he or she misrepre-
sents a material fact or creates a false impression by words or acts in
order to mislead or obtain an undue advantage where the parties do
not have equal access to the means of information—such conduct
serving to vitiate and void the contract.131
The other equally important reason for checking fraud lies in the
sense of moral approbation.  Under long-recognized principles of nat-
ural justice, fraud or deceit was not countenanced because it was “an
evil act with an evil intent.”132
4. Trust and Will
While affirmative misrepresentations were actionable, silence was
not.133  However, where the conditions were not reasonably discover-
able by the buyer, and the seller had knowledge of them, the seller
had a duty to speak.134  The courts took varying views on whether a
129. Cox v. Montgomery, 36 Ill. 396, 398 (1865) (explaining that the seller knew
that the buyer “was dealing with him in full reliance upon his statements, which he
professed to make from his personal knowledge of the land, and this fact imposed
upon an additional obligation to be truthful, which a man of ordinary uprightness
would have jealously respected”).
130. Pridgen v. Long, 98 S.E. 451, 454 (N.C. 1919); Gray v. James, 65 S.E. 644, 645
(N.C. 1909); Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C. 233, 238 (1872).
131. Mitchell v. Zimmerman, 4 Tex. 75, 79 (1849) (internal citations omitted).
132. Bell v. Harrison, 102 S.E. 200, 204 (N.C. 1920).
133. Phillips v. Homestake Consol. Placer Mines Co., 273 P. 657, 658 (Nev. 1929)
(holding purchaser discovered that all the ore and gravel of commercial had been
extracted from the property before the time of purchase—the seller failed to disclose
this fact).  The general rule, like all seeming absolutes, was filled with exceptions.
First, nondisclosure of defects likely to cause bodily harm or property damage was
often held to be actionable. See, e.g., Ultramares Corp. v. Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 447
(N.Y. 1931); Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275, 276 (N.Y. 1922).
134. See Pac. Portland Cement Co. v. Placer Cnty. Land Co., 201 P. 126, 128 (Cal.
1921) (holding that the buyer had a duty to inquire as to seller’s title).  “Mere expres-
sions of opinion as to the sufficiency of title, when the means of information are
equally accessible to both parties, or the same facts are within the knowledge of both
parties, and when no confidential relation exists between them, do not constitute
fraud or deceit upon the part of the vendor.” Id.; see also Fausett & Co. v. Bullard,
229 S.W.2d 490, 491 (Ark. 1950) (explaining the general rule is that “[i]f the means of
information are alike accessible to both, so that, with ordinary prudence or vigilance,
the parties might respectively rely upon their own judgment, they must be presumed
to have done so; or if they have not so informed themselves, must abide the conse-
quences of their own inattention and carelessness.”) (citing Yeates v. Pryor, 11 Ark.
58, 66 (1850)); Mincy v. Crisler, 96 So. 162, 163 (Miss. 1923) (holding for the purchaser
where seller constructed a house on foundation pillars resting on decaying lumber
that was covering a 6-foot ditch, thus knowingly creating a foundational defect that
could not be detected from an examination of the exterior of the premises); Adkins v.
Stewart, 166 S.W. 984, 985 (Ky. 1914) (discussing two views on hidden defects); Ripy
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seller could escape liability for fraud and misrepresentations on the
ground that the buyer should have investigated for himself.135  If de-
fects were patent, caveat emptor applied and the seller, even knowing
of their existence, could not be held liable for failure to disclose them,
unless he did something to prevent investigation.136  However, if the
defect was latent and known to the seller, his mere silence with knowl-
edge that the buyer is acting upon the assumption that no defect exists
amounted to actionable fraud.137  Of course, active concealment could
be just as deceitful as a positive false statement.138  Even the employ-
ment of artifices, deceits, and frauds to discourage a purchaser from
inquiring or investigating would be actionable.139  Indeed, it may be
v. Cronon, 115 S.W. 791, 794 (Ky. 1909) (holding where facts are not within vendor’s
knowledge, but are equally available, vendee must use his means of knowledge—and
in failing to do so, he cannot recover on the ground of being misled by vendor); War-
dell v. Fosdick, 13 Johns. 325, 327 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (allowing the plaintiffs to
nullify a purchase of land in Pennsylvania based on the sellers apparent fraudulent act
of engaging in the sale of land he knew did not exist).
135. See, e.g., Sipola v. Winship, 66 A. 962 (N.H. 1907).  A case where defendant
represented that wood and timber on the farm were worth over $1,000 when in fact
they were not worth over $600 and also represented that there were 45 acres of tillage
land when in fact there were only 18.  Though buyer examined the tillage fully, he had
no definite idea of the extent of an acre of land and therefore relied on plaintiff’s oral
assurances.  The court, quoting Pringle v. Samuel, 11 Ky. 43, 46 (1822), stated “we do
not remember any case, where the maxim quoted [caveat emptor] has been used by
the chancellor, in such manner as to compel him to shut his ears against false repre-
sentations, or to give latitude to a vender of real estate to state facts untruly, without
any responsibility.” Id.  “It does not lie in the mouth of the vendor to complain that
the vendee took him at his word.” Sipola, 66 A. at 966. See also Coon v. Atwell, 46
N.H. 510, 512–513 (1866).
136. Adkins, 166 S.W. at 985; EDWARD SUGDEN, THE LAW OF VENDORS AND PUR-
CHASERS OF ESTATES 276 (13th ed. 1857); STORY, supra note 104, at § 216 (citing 2
Kent 482).
137. Adkins, 166 S.W. at 985 (finding seller lacked knowledge of the defect and no
facts would permit an inference thereof). See also Cohen v. Vivian, 349 P.2d 366
(Colo. 1960); Greenberg v. Glickman, 50 N.Y.S.2d 489 (1944), modified, 268 A.D. 882
(N.Y. App. Div. 1944) (finding an action exists against seller concerning concealment
of subsurface water condition resulting in flooding of the basement of residence con-
structed by seller, while seller’s contract to erect building with finished basement fur-
ther “invited the impression that there were no conditions below the surface of the
land that would affect the utilization of the basement”); Groves v. Chase, 151 P. 913,
914–915 (Colo. 1915) (holding that lack of equal access of information precludes ap-
plication of caveat emptor).  Practical difficulties, such as distance and difficult terrain,
might excuse a buyer from conducting an investigation of the land offered for sale,
entitling buyer to rely upon seller’s representations and if they prove to be false, seek
rescission or damages.  See Miner v. Medbury, 6 Wis. 295, 317–318 (1858); see also
Cohen, 349 P.2d 366, 367–368 (Colo. 1960) (holding that failure to disclose a known
defect, otherwise undiscoverable—e.g., latent soil defect—amounts to concealment);
Boyce v. Grundy, 28 U.S. 210 (1830).
138. Adkins, 166 S.W. at 985 (citing Hughes v. Robertson, 17 Ky. 215 (1824)).
139. See, e.g., Southern v. Floyd, 80 S.E.2d 490, 491 (Ga. 1954) (finding vendor
failed to disclose defects in furnace, and also covered a break in the boiler of the
furnace with a temporary filling, thereby concealing the defect from the buyer who
inspected the property); Herzog v. Capital Co., 164 P.2d 8, 10 (Cal. 1945) (holding
vendor’s failure to disclose his agents’ refinishing and painting concealed structural
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even worse where the buyer is unable to learn of and order repairs.
While the maxim entitled the seller to remain silent, if he did venture
to speak, he was required to speak truthfully.140
When a buyer did rely on a seller’s statements, many courts would
not permit a seller to excuse his false statements on the basis that the
purchaser should not have believed him for the law would not hear
the guilty party say: “You were yourself guilty of negligence,” or “you
ought not to have trusted me.”141  It would have been a true perver-
sion of law and justice to allow caveat emptor to enable positive fraud
defects and amounted to fraud); Rice v. Silverston, 48 N.E. 969, 970–71 (Ill. 1897)
(holding while seller pretended that he wanted buyer to examine land for himself, he
succeeded—by indirection—in making buyer believe that an investigation would not
be necessary).
140. If the purchaser had not examined the property before purchase, but relied on
seller’s representations that were false, seller’s conduct would be actionable. Boyce,
28 U.S. at 218, 220 (finding misrepresentations by seller that vitiated the contract).
The court rejected the seller’s argument that the purchaser bought with knowledge of
the problem with inundation, where the seller mentioned the land’s overflowing, but
stated that overflowing could be prevented by a levee at small expense. Id. The com-
munication was not of such full and decided character as to amount to a communica-
tion of knowledge to the purchaser. Id. Nor was it sufficient to put the purchaser to
inquiry, because he had the seller’s positive assurances to the contrary. Id. He had a
right to rely upon such assurances without inquiry. Id. at 218; see also Groves, 151 P.
at 913–14 (holding that where purchaser visited the land at a time when it was snow
covered, and thus inspection would not be informative, purchaser was entitled to rely
upon representations made by seller that, inter alia, the land was good corn producing
land, and could hold seller liable as the facts showed these to be misrepresentations);
Bianconi v. Smith, 28 P. 880, 881 (Ariz. 1892) (holding that buyer neglected to inquire
as to seller’s title and/or to obtain a deed containing warranties of title where another
person was in possession of the deed at the time of the contract); Erickson v. Fisher,
53 N.W. 638, 638 (1892) (involving a land exchange where seller pointed in the direc-
tion of the subject lots, but no lot specifically, and buyer relied upon seller’s represen-
tation); Schumaker v. Mather, 133 N.Y. 590, 590 (1892) (holding failure of buyer to
inspect the farm does not preclude a claim against seller where the seller made mis-
representations on which the purchaser relied); Clarke v. Baird, 7 Barb. 64 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1849) (holding that fraudulent misrepresentations or false assertions, respecting a
fact material to show the value of land, by which the purchaser is injured, will subject
the seller to an action in deceit, even though it was in the power of the purchaser to
ascertain whether the assertion was true or false, but in fact relies upon seller’s repre-
sentations); Sherwood v. Salmon, 5 Day 439, 445 (Conn. 1813) (affirming the principle
“that it is not the duty of the vendee to make enquiry [sic], whether the representa-
tion of the vendor be true or not, though it is in his power to do it; but he may rely on
such representation, and if it be false, he is entitled to his remedy.”); Fishback v.
Miller, 15 Nev. 428, 440–41 (1880) (holding purchaser could rely on seller’s statements
of facts as to the location of a shaft and was under no obligation to investigate and
verify the statement to which the seller has deliberately pledged his faith); Sipola, 66
A. at 96; Cowger v. Gordon, 4 Blackf. 110 (Ind. 1835). But see Parker v. Moulton, 114
Mass. 99, 99 (1873) (holding buyer was not excused from examination unless he was
fraudulently induced to forbear from inquiries that he would have otherwise made).
141. MELVIN M. BIGELOW, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF FRAUD ON ITS CIVIL SIDE
523–24 (2d ed. 1888); WILLIAM WILLIAMSON KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
FRAUD AND MISTAKE 40–42 (2d ed., 1883); Cottril v. Krum, 13 S.W. 753, 755 (Mo.
1890); Judd v. Walker, 114 S.W. 979 (Mo. 1908); John Schweyer & Co. v. Mellon, 162
N.W. 1006, 1008–09 (Mich. 1917).
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upon the unwary142 or to require a defrauded party to use diligence to
discover the fraud.143  Indeed, “the law does not require a prudent
man to deal with every one as a rascal, and demand covenants to
guard against the falsehood of every representation which may be
made as to facts which constitute material inducements to a con-
tract.”144  Even buyer’s independent inquiries will not necessarily ex-
cuse seller’s misrepresentation if the buyer relies on seller’s
statements.145
IV. FROM WILL TO OUGHT
As the prospect of liability did not always counsel sellers to be hon-
est and forthcoming about the condition of property held out for sale,
and ex-post remedies proved insufficient to make buyers whole or
undo injuries that might have fallen upon the buyer or third parties, a
new approach to the problem was necessary: one imposing a duty of
disclosure.  That approach grew out of a general utilitarian movement
in the early 19th century.  Utilitarianism at first meant the use of law
to promote economic growth, which often sacrificed an individualized
sense of justice.146  The claims of individualism and localism, which
had emerged in the 18th century, were frequently subordinated by the
perceived need for standardization in national markets and a national
economy.147  Law became more goal-oriented.148  The late-19th-cen-
tury thinkers were attempting to create an autonomous system of le-
gal doctrine in which law was sharply separate from politics.149
Political reasoning was subjective, discretionary, and a matter of opin-
ion; but legal reasoning was objective and not subject to the whims of
the judge.150  Law was conceived as a science.151
142. Burger v. Calek, 215 P. 981, 981 (Idaho 1923).
143. Steele v. Banninga, 196 N.W. 404, 405 (Mich. 1923); Beetle v. Anderson, 73
N.W. 560 (Wis. 1897); Burger, 215 P. at 238 (holding one has the right to rely upon a
statement of a material fact made as a positive assertion under circumstances from
which it is fairly inferable that the parties making the statement knew that the former
was relying expressly upon this representation).
144. Bell v. Harrison, 102 S.E. 200, 203 (N.C. 1920); Walsh v. Hall, 66 N.C. 233, 243
(1872). But see Etheridge v. Vernoy, 70 N.C. 713 (1874) (“Even fraud in the misrepre-
sentation will not entitle the vendee to relief, unless that fraud is such that the plain-
tiff could not have reasonably provided against it under the maxim, caveat emptor.”).
145. See, e.g., Wood v. Jones, 237 S.W. 99, 101 (Ark. 1922) (holding where seller has
peculiar knowledge, makes false representations in order to induce, and thereby does
induce buyer to rely upon his false statement, seller will not be heard to say buyer
should have ascertained the truth).
146. HORWITZ, supra note 61, at 36.
147. MORRIS R. COHEN, LAW AND THE SOCIAL ORDER: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOS-
OPHY 106–08 (1982).
148. KELLY, supra note 35, at 315.
149. HORWITZ, supra note 61, at 198.
150. Id. at 199.
151. Id. at 200–01.
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Protecting freedom of contract would further the interests of society
in a large and robust industrial economy.  State statutes aiming to pro-
tect workers from pitiful wages, children from dangerous industries
and interminable hours of labor, and workers generally from oppres-
sive working conditions were struck down in violation of a property
right guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the
Constitution.152  The courts were slow in recognizing the dangers and
harms that seemed inherent in the inequality of bargaining power that
characterized relationships between worker and factory owner in in-
dustrial society.  It was not really until the first third of the 20th cen-
tury that courts took the position that freedom of contract had gone
too far.153  Changes in society—great depressions, railroad amalgama-
tions, unregulated working conditions, child labor, and other problems
wrought by the industrial movement—caused a rethinking of the vir-
tues of freedom of contract in its absolute sense.  It came to be recog-
nized that:
Society, in granting freedom of contract, did not guarantee that all
members of the community would be able to utilize it to the same
extent.  The free use that can be made of contract will depend on
the system governing the distribution of property: to the extent that
the law sanctions an unequal distribution of property, freedom of
contract inevitably becomes a one-sided privilege.154
The reaction was the enactment of a host of legislation regulating con-
tracts of all kinds, e.g., insurance, labor, utilities, and mortgages.155
The courts’ rethinking of the practical and moral force behind free-
dom of contract was perhaps prompted by a change in legal philoso-
phy generally.  Writers in the early 20th century wrote of the legal
system in terms of its normative functions, that is, of “‘ought proposi-
tions’, which could be, within [their] own terms, valid and illuminat-
ing, regardless of the moral quality of those norms, and indeed
independent of all extraneous ethical, social, economic, or political
values.”156  In other words, the legal “ought,” the norm, was viewed as
a purely formal character, subject to evaluation of its own terms and
logic, not of any other scientific or sociological standards.157  The law’s
purpose is to cause adherence to these oughts.158  Pound stated that:
152. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1904); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161, 179–80 (1907); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 26 (1914).
153. See DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT 103–10 (2011) (discussing vari-
ous ameliorative legislation during this era); Kennedy, supra note 65, at 117–18, 120,
123–24 (discussing the abandonment of freedom of contract for reasons of policy and
in the public interest).
154. KESSLER & SHARP, CASES ON CONTRACT iii–xvi (rev. ed. 1950), as reprinted
in MORRIS R. COHEN & FELIX S. COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 143–44 (Erwin N. Griswold et al. eds., 1951).
155. MAYER, supra note 153, at 103–10.
156. KELLY, supra note 35, at 356.
157. Id. at 387.
158. Id. at 386.
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Looked at functionally, the law is an attempt to reconcile, to harmo-
nize, to compromise . . . overlapping or conflicting interests, either
through securing them directly and immediately, or through secur-
ing certain individual interests . . . so as to give effect to the greatest
number of interests or to the interests that weigh most in our civili-
zation, with the least sacrifice of other interests . . . . I venture to
think of problems of eliminating friction and precluding waste in
human enjoyment of the goods of existence, and of the legal order
as a system of social engineering whereby these ends are
achieved.159
This proposition is an expression of the views of the positivists.  For
the positivists, law is what the lawmakers have laid down.160  Its func-
tion is to achieve adherence.161  The law is unconcerned with any par-
ticular end or moral standard.162  This is because human societies have
no necessary or inherently desirable ends, only competing desires or
interests, which are favored by the majority, or those with the most
influence win out.163  The law can legitimately impose liability on con-
duct without any pretense that such conduct is morally wrong or oth-
erwise blameworthy.164  Law operates by the threat of the bayonet in
one’s back or the rope.165
These notions operated to push more courts to place limits on, or
abandon, caveat emptor. While the courts reiterated the longstanding
exceptions (i.e., where there was affirmative fraud, active conceal-
ment, or the inability of the buyer to inspect the property), courts
adopted new principles that extended the exceptions to make the
maxim inapplicable.  For instance, where the vendor had special
knowledge not apparent to the purchaser, and he was aware that the
purchaser was acting under a misapprehension as to facts that would
be important to the purchaser, he had a duty to disclose.166  Also,
159. Roscoe Pound, A Theory of Social Interests 15, 16 (1921), reprinted in J. HALL,
READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE 238, 245–46 (Jerome Hall ed., 1938).
160. ROGER COTTERREL, THE POLITICS OF JURISPRUDENCE: A CRITICAL INTRO-
DUCTION TO LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 118, 121, 126 (1989).
161. Id.; see also Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Admiral Dewey, in THE OCCA-
SIONAL SPEECHES OF JUSTICE OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES 169–72 (Mark DeWowe,
ed., 1962); H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 593, 597–601 (1958).
162. Steven R. Perry, Holmes v. Hart, in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS INFLU-
ENCE: THE LEGACY OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR. 158, 181 (Steven J. Burton,
ed., 2000); see also Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457–58, 460, 469 (1897); Hart, supra note 161, at 602–04, 624, 626 (1958).
163. See Hart, supra note 161, at 602–604, 624, 626 (1958).
164. David Luban, The Bad Man and the Good Lawyer: A Centennial Essay on
Holmes’s the Path of the Law, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1551–52 (1997).
165. Holmes, supra note 162, at 457; see also Luban, supra note 164, at 1554.
166. See Holcomb v. Zinke, 365 N.W.2d 507, 511 (N.D. 1985); Smith v. Nat’l Resort
Cmtys., Inc., 585 S.W.2d 655, 659–60 (Tex. 1979); Wilhite v. Mays, 232 S.E.2d 141,
142–43 (Ga. 1976) (holding buyer agreed to purchase a house unaware of a major
defect in the house’s underground sewerage system of which the seller had knowledge
of and knew the defective condition would affect the buyer’s decision to purchase);
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where the condition posed a danger to health and safety, the vendor
was obligated to make disclosures, whether or not the buyer could
have discovered the defect.167  Further, courts began charging vendors
with obligations to disclose defects, not only of which they had actual
knowledge, but also those of which the vendor should have known.168
As before, sellers were not allowed to defend against a charge of mis-
representation or fraud on the basis that the purchaser was too credu-
lous, that she should not have believed him.169
A. Responses: Entrepreneurs and Rascals
Parties determined to regain the advantage of superior knowledge
devised entrepreneurial responses.  Rational marketplace actors will
implement measures aimed at limiting exposure to liability.  First, they
will describe precisely the obligations undertaken—the scope of the
work, limits, and exceptions.  Then, they will incorporate disclaim-
ers—about what the work does not entail and what the actors have
not undertaken or represented.  Last, they will define the remedies—
the contract price, but not consequential damages.  Under the new
regime requiring honest disclosures, if buyers could insist upon honest
disclosures, sellers would make representations but suggest that buy-
ers look for themselves and extract promises from buyers that they
were not relying upon any of seller’s representations. In addition,
where sellers make representations on which they intended a buyer to
rely, sellers would insist those representations were not made for the
benefit of any other party and should not be used for any other pur-
pose.  While these measures on their face seem entirely unobjection-
able, problems arise when it is later revealed that sellers did make
false representations with intent that buyers rely, and buyers did rely
to their injury.
Addressing the circumventions of new standards of probity, courts
have fallen into three discernible camps: (1) enforcing the contracts as
a matter of free will; (2) striking down the contracts that violate stan-
dards of honesty or are fraudulent; and (3) examining the transactions
see also Brooks v. Ervin Constr. Co., 116 S.E.2d 454, 458 (N.C. 1960) (holding the
vendor failed to disclose that the lot consisted of disturbed earth as a result of the
vendor’s burying wood, branches, and other debris the vendor burned in a large hole
on the lot); Kaze v. Compton, 283 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Ky. 1955) (holding the vendors
concealed the existence of a drain tile which ran beneath the house causing water to
accumulate under the house and in the yard); Rothstein v. Janss Inv. Corp., 113 P.2d
465, 469–70 (Cal. Ct. App. 1941) (holding buyer relied on false representations that
the property lot was solid and did not contain a fill made by the sellers agent, who had
knowledge that said lot was a fill-in lot).
167. See Fennell Realty Co. v. Martin, 529 So. 2d 1003, 1005 (Ala. 1988); Cashion v.
Ahmadi, 345 So. 2d 268, 271 (Ala. 1977), superseded by statute, ALA. CODE § 34-37-4
(1975), as recognized in Fisher v. Comer Plantation, Inc., 772 So. 2d 445 (Ala. 2000).
168. Gasteiger v. Gillenwater, 417 S.W.2d 568, 571–72 (Tenn. 1967); Lingsch v. Sav-
age, 29 Cal. Rptr. 201 (Dist. Ct. App. 1963).
169. Johnson v. Owens, 140 S.E.2d 311, 314 (N.C. 1965).
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on a case-by-case basis, ignoring buyers’ formal representations of no
reliance, and looking for evidence of reliance in fact.
1. Disclaimers, Free Will, and Fools
One line of cases takes the hard, unsympathetic stance that the
buyer can find no relief from the courts where the buyer has foolishly
trusted the seller and formally stated that he has not.  In Teer v. John-
ston,170 recounted above, the buyers contended they signed the
purchase agreement based on the representations set forth in the dis-
closure statement.171  It was undisputed that neither the disclosure
statement nor the representations made in the disclosure statement
were added as an addendum to the purchase agreement.172
In their action for rescission based on intentional fraud, the buyers
faced several hurdles that proved insurmountable: caveat emptor,
merger, and the “as is” clause.173  First, Alabama still adhered to ca-
veat emptor with respect to used homes, except that a seller must dis-
close conditions that threaten health and safety.174  Second, in order
for the Teers to recover for fraudulent misrepresentation, they had to
establish the fraudulent misrepresentation survived the execution and
delivery of the contract.175  Not only was there no survival, the dis-
claimer clause operated to keep out parol evidence or polar represen-
tations from the contract.176  Third, the court found that the “as is”
clause negated the element of reliance necessary for a cause of action
for fraud.177  In the end, the court admonished buyers that caveat
emptor still prevails in the state, and the onus was on the buyer to
conduct his own investigations.  Indeed the buyer’s wariness should be
heightened in the face of  “disclaimer” and “as is” clauses.178  This was
a hard position to leave the buyer in, considering any wariness the
buyer might otherwise have had was put off by the seller’s false repre-
sentations about the property condition before signing.
The Georgia courts also have turned away the duped buyer, leaving
him to what he ostensibly bargained for.  In Novare Group, Inc. v.
Sarif, the buyer purchased a condominium unit, expecting to have a
particular view based upon representations by the developer.179  All
the while, the developer had planned to construct another building
that would block that view.180  The court rejected the buyer’s plea for
170. Teer v. Johnston, 60 So. 3d 253, 253 (Ala. 2010).
171. Id. at 255.
172. Id. at 255.
173. Id. at 256–58.
174. Id. at 256.
175. Id. at 257.
176. Id. at 261.
177. Id. at 258.
178. Id. at 261.
179. Novare Group, Inc. v. Sarif, 718 S.E.2d 304, 306 (Ga. 2011).
180. Id.
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rescission saying, “it is well-settled law in Georgia that a party who
has ‘the capacity and opportunity to read a written contract cannot
afterwards set up fraud in the procurement of his signature to the in-
strument’ based on oral representations that differ from the terms of
the contract.”181  Indeed, only when a party can show that he has
somehow been prevented from reading the contract, will a claim for
fraud be heard.182  Because the purchasers signed agreements that ex-
pressly stated that the views might change over time, they could not
have relied upon any oral representations of the sellers so far as the
law was concerned.183 The entire agreement between the parties was
set forth in the terms of the written contract—the purchasers affirmed
the contract that contained a merger or disclaimer provision that “oral
representations [could not] be relied upon as correctly stating the rep-
resentations of seller.”184  This meant that the buyers were estopped
from asserting reliance on a representation that was not part of the
contract.185  Inasmuch as justifiable reliance is an essential element of
a claim of fraud, negligent misrepresentation, and the Fair Business
Practices Act (“FBPA”) claims,186 the purchasers could not sustain
any of the causes of action that required justifiable reliance.187
New York courts are in accord with Georgia and Alabama, essen-
tially finding a buyer’s execution of a contract with a disclaimer clause
181. Id. at 308 (citing Craft v. Drake, 260 S.E.2d 475, 477 (Ga. 1979)).  In Craft, the
plaintiff alleged that a bank officer fraudulently induced him to execute certain notes
by misrepresenting that the plaintiff’s home would not be used as collateral for the
note.  However, the express terms of the note stated that the holder would have a
security interest in any property held by the plaintiff at the time of execution or subse-
quently acquired.  The court held that because the oral misrepresentation was directly
contradicted by the language of the agreement, and because the statements were
promissory in nature as to future acts, the plaintiff was bound by the terms of the note
he signed. See Craft, 260 S.E.2d at 475.
182. Novare, 718 S.E.2d at 308 (citing Beckwith v. Peterson, 181 S.E.2d 51, 52–53
(Ga. 1971)).
183. Id. at 308.
184. Id. at 307.
185. Id. at 309 (citing First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 546 S.E.2d 781, 785 (Ga. 2001)).
186. Id. (citing Tiismann v. Linda Martin Homes Corp., 637 S.E.2d 14, 16 (Ga.
2006)) (reliance element of common law misrepresentation is incorporated into the
causation element of an individual claim under the FBPA); City Dodge, Inc. v. Gard-
ner, 208 S.E.2d 794, 797 (Ga. 1974) (noting that justifiable reliance is an essential
element of a fraud claim); Real Estate Int’l., Inc. v. Buggay, 469 S.E.2d 242, 245 (Ga.
1996) (noting that justifiable reliance is essential element of a negligent misrepresen-
tation claim).
187. Novare, 718 S.E.2d at 308.  Nevertheless, purchasers also argued that the de-
termination of justifiable reliance is a jury question, but the court explained that
“[w]hile justifiable reliance may be a jury question in a fraud case where no contract
exists or where the contract has become void, it is a question of law in a case where
the contract language prevails and the contract’s merger clause precludes reliance on
oral representations.” Id. at 309. The court compared City Dodge holding that justifi-
able reliance is a jury question where the contract containing the merger clause was
found invalid due to an antecedent fraud, with First Data POS holding as a matter of
law that a valid merger clause precludes any subsequent claim for deceit based on
pre-contractual representations. Id.
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as conclusive on the parties’ undertakings and representations.188  The
courts in Florida are on both sides of the issue.189  Some hold that a
merger or integration clause does not preclude an action based upon
oral representations that fraudulently induced the entering into the
contract,190 while others hold that actions are barred when oral repre-
sentations are expressly contradicted by the written instrument.191
2. Disclaimers in the Face of Knowing False Statements
Another group of courts see through the subterfuge of “as is” and
disclaimer-of-reliance clauses and find their use in the scenarios dis-
cussed below to be fraudulent.192  The California courts have been
most definitive in their position:
188. See Dolansky v. Frisillo, 939 N.Y.S.2d 210, 214 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (allega-
tions of “fraudulent inducement may not be maintained if specific disclaimer provi-
sions in the contract of sale disavows reliance upon oral representations”); Tarantul v.
Cherkassky, 923 N.Y.S.2d 133, 135 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011) (holding that buyers had
expressly represented that “the sellers had not made any representation as to the
physical condition or any matter or thing affecting or relating to the property or the
contract except as specifically set forth therein, and that the buyers were relying on
their own inspection of the property”); Laxer v. Edelman, 75 A.D.3d 584, 586 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2010); Bedowitz v. Farrell Dev. Co., 289 A.D.2d 432, 433 (N.Y. App. Div.
2001); Cohan v. Sicular, 214 A.D.2d 637, 638 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995); Bd. of Managers.
of the Chelsea 19 Condo. v. Chelsea 19 Assocs., 905 N.Y.S.2d 8, 10 (N.Y. App. Div.
2010) (plaintiffs were foreclosed from establishing reliance by the specific disclaimers
and by their undertaking to conduct their own investigation); but see DiBuono v. Ab-
bey, LLC, 944 N.Y.S.2d 280, 284 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012) (“While a general merger
clause is ineffective to exclude parol evidence of fraud, a specific disclaimer will de-
feat any allegation that the contract was executed in reliance on contrary oral
representations.”).
189. Adrian Roggenbuck Trust v. Dev. Res. Grp., LLC, 505 F. Appx. 857, 861–62
(11th Cir. 2013); Noack v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla., Inc., 742 So. 2d 433, 434
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999); Ortiz v. Orchid Springs Dev. Corp., 504 So. 2d 510, 510
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); see also Levinson v. Preferred Home Mortg. Co., No. 12-
80300-CIV., 2013 WL 588517, at *6 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2013) (finding that disclaimers
of reliance had the effect of directly repudiating any prior statements that the seller or
lender may have made directly or indirectly through their agents and expressly con-
tradicted the plaintiffs’ claims about being fraudulently induced to purchase based on
any representations by the defendants regarding the value of the property and as a
matter of law, they defeat the element of reasonable reliance necessary for a fraudu-
lent inducement claim);  G Barrett LLC v. Ginn Co., 494 F. App’x. 944, 946–47 (11th
Cir. 2012) (holding that a purchaser of property parcel did not act in reliance on any
false representation by mortgagee regarding property value so as to establish prima
facie case of fraudulent inducement, under Florida law, where loan application con-
tained purchaser’s express disclaimer of reliance on any representation as to property
value).
190. Mejia v. Jurich, 781 So. 2d 1175, 1178 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2001); Romo v.
Amedex Ins. Co., 930 So. 2d 643, 650–53 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that
reasonable reliance remained a disputed issue of fact despite a contract’s disclaimer).
191. Hillcrest Pac. Corp. v. Yamamura, 727 So. 2d 1053, 1056 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1999).
192. To establish a right to relief for a claim of fraudulent representation or con-
cealment, a plaintiff must establish the following elements:
representation or, where there is a duty to disclose, concealment of a
(a) fact,
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A party to a contract who has been guilty of fraud in its inducement
cannot absolve himself . . . from the effects of his . . . fraud by any
stipulation in the contract, either that no representations have been
made, or that any right that might be grounded upon them is
waived. Such a stipulation or waiver will be ignored, and parol evi-
dence of misrepresentations will be admitted, for the reason that
fraud renders the whole agreement voidable, including the waiver
provision.193
The use of such clauses is affirmative fraud in Ohio.  In Northpoint
Properties, Inc. v. Charter One Bank,194 the parties agreed to the sale
and purchase of a 15-story commercial office building.195  The sale
contained disclaimers regarding representations and warranties.196
Thereafter, it was discovered that the fire-suppression system was not
working properly and the drinking water had a bad taste.197  The
buyer sued.  However, the contract and purchasing instructions pro-
(b) which is material to the transaction at hand,
made falsely, with knowledge of its falsity, or with such utter disregard
and recklessness as to whether it is true or false that knowledge may be
(c) inferred,
(d) with the intent of misleading another into relying upon it,
(e) justifiable reliance upon the representation or concealment, and
(f) a resulting injury proximately caused by the reliance.
Northpoint  Props, Inc. v. Charter One Bank, No. 94020, 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS
2206, at *32 (Ohio Ct. App. May 26, 2011) (quoting Groob v. KeyBank, 843 N.E.2d
1170, 1178 (Ohio 2006)).
193. Kenneally v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 711 F. Supp. 2d 1174, 1187 (S.D. Cal. 2010)
(alteration in original) (quoting McClain v. Octagon Plaza, LLC, 71 Cal. Rptr. 3d 885,
893 (Ct. App. 2008) (contractual disclaimer of reliance did not bar claims against the
developers for fraud under 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(2)(B) of the Land Sales Act, fraud
under CAL. CIV. CODE § 1709, or unfair competition and false advertising under CAL.
BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 17200, 17500, regarding the size of condominium units)).  In
Kenneally, “ ‘ [t]he purchase contract stated [the] unit would be 1404 square feet . . . .
The [Seller’s] . . . website . . . further represented that units with the floor plan of [the
unit] would be ‘1395–1404 sq. ft. approx.’  In fact, the size of the unit, as measured by
an independent appraiser, [was] 1248 square feet, 156 square feet smaller than the size
claimed in the contract and 148 square feet smaller than the lower bounds of the
range on the . . .  website.” Id. at 1178. The contract stated:  “‘Buyer by its execution
of this Agreement agrees that it is not relying upon any brochures, sales documents,
or oral statements by Seller or Seller’s agents regarding the square footage of the
Condominium.’” Id. at 1179.  The plaintiffs maintained that “[a]s [the Purchase
Agreement] attempts to waive Buyer’s reliance on such documentation and state-
ments as they relate to the purchase of units . . . effectively allowing the Seller to offer
a unit of any size and composition it chooses, the contract [would be] illusory.” Id.
(emphasis added).  The court could not “conclude that the ‘no reliance’ provisions in
the Purchase Agreement render[ed] Plaintiff’s alleged reliance unreasonable as a
matter of law.” Id. at 1186; see also Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Ctr., 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d
364, 372 (Ct. App. 2005) (“[A] per se rule that an integration/no oral representations
clause establishes, as a matter of law, that a party claiming fraud did not reasonably
rely on representations not contained in the contract is inconsistent with California
law.”).
194. Northpoint Props., Inc., 2011 Ohio App. LEXIS 2206.
195. Id. at *2–3.
196. Id. at *8.
197. Id.
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vided that the building was being sold in its “as is, where is” condition
and contained disclaimers regarding representations and warranties
that buyers could only rely on their own inspections and investigations
of the property.198  Rejecting the seller’s defense based on the nature
of the contract and disclaimer clause, the court explained that while
an “as is” clause does bar a claim for nondisclosure, it does not bar a
claim of affirmative fraud, such as fraudulent concealment or misrep-
resentation.199 Moreover, a seller’s use of a disclaimer clause does not
necessarily shield him from liability or negate justifiable reliance by
the buyer. General disclaimers do not insulate sellers who knowingly
make false statements.200 The court also ruled that the parol evidence
rule does not bar the introduction of evidence of the fraud that in-
duced the written contract.201
Similarly, the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recognized that the
very fact of the material representation is itself enough to justify a
buyer’s reasonable reliance on its accuracy, not needing to cast
buyer’s conduct as unduly stupid or gullible.  In Bowman v. Presley,202
the court ruled that a buyer can reasonably rely on seller’s assurances
of size, without being required to determine the truth or falsity of the
fact represented.  The common-law doctrine of caveat emptor does not
reach situations where a purchaser of real property has relied upon a
positive representation of material fact.203
The Arkansas courts have stated emphatically what a seller’s bur-
den is in trying to avoid liability in an “as is” sale.  In Williams v.
Hertzog, the court ruled that in order for a seller’s liability to be re-
lieved under a buyer’s disclaimer provision, the seller must first in-
form the buyer as to the true condition of the property, not merely the
condition of the house as described in the disclosure agreement.204
The true condition of a property is not disclosed to the buyer when a
condition is hidden or misrepresented by the seller.205  Thus, a seller
cannot include an “as is” provision in a realty contract, make a fraudu-
lent misrepresentation, and then attempt to shield himself from liabil-
ity based on those misrepresentations by virtue of the “as is”
198. Id. at *6–9.
199. Id. at *33 (citing Tipton v. Nuzum, 616 N.E.3d 265 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992)).
200. Id. (citing In re Nat’l Century Fin. Enters., Inc., Inv. Litig., 541 F. Supp. 2d 986,
1005 (S.D. Ohio 2007)).
201. Id. (citing Galmish v. Cicchini, 734 N.E.2d 782, 789 (Ohio 2000)); see also Des-
champs v. Treasure State Trailer Court Ltd., 230 P.3d 800, 806 (Mont. 2010) (showing
where alleged oral promise directly contradict the terms of an express written con-
tract, the parol evidence rule applies; the exception only applicable where the alleged
fraud does not relate directly to the subject of the contract).
202. Bowman v. Presley, 212 P.3d 1210 (Okla. 2009).
203. Id. at 1221.
204. Williams v. Hertzog, No. CA06-560, 2007 Ark. App. Ct. LEXIS 265, at *6
(Apr. 11, 2007).
205. Id. at *1.
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provision.206  Otherwise, “[i]f the as-is provision is given effect where
the sellers made a fraudulent misrepresentation, then the disclosure
form included in the realty contract is merely an illusory term of the
parties’ agreement that induces fraudulent reliance.”207
3. Representations and Reliance in Fact
Texas courts, in the third group, have labored hard to strike a bal-
ance between protecting parties’ ability to bargain freely and protect-
ing honesty in contractual relations.  These courts make a distinction
between sellers’ disclaimers about representations outside the con-
tract and buyers’ disclaimer of, or reliance on, representations.  Re-
cently, the Texas Supreme Court took great pains to draw that line.  In
Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Insurance Company of
America, the Court stated it had recognized decades ago that a merger
clause “does not waive the right to sue for fraud should a party later
discover that the representations it relied upon before signing the con-
tract were fraudulent.”208  The principal issue in the case was whether
“disclaimer-of-representations language within a lease contract
amount[ed] to a standard merger clause, or also disclaim[ed] reliance
on representations, thus negating an element of the petitioner’s claim
for fraudulent inducement of that contract.”209  The Secchis, owners
and operators of the Italian Cowboy restaurant, terminated a lease
because of a persistent gas odor and filed suit against Prudential In-
206. Id. at *17–18.
207. Id. at *18. See also Pickering v. Garrison, No. CA08-810, 2009 Ark. App.
LEXIS 87, at *15 (Feb. 18, 2009) (holding “as is” and disclaimer-of-reliance clauses
did not require judgment for seller; but justifiable reliance on representations by sell-
ers, even where buyer has conducted his own investigation, is a question for the jury);
but see Worley v. City of Jonesboro, 385 S.W.3d 908, 911 (Ark. Ct. App. 2011) (hold-
ing reliance not justified where owner qualified representations, not false, and buyer
did not read inspection report); see also Bauer v. Giannis, 834 N.E.2d 952, 962 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005) (holding “as is” language in a real estate sale contract does not shield a
seller from liability for fraud); S. Dev. Co. v. Pima Capital Mgmt. Co., 31 P.3d 123,
129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001) (holding a vendor must disclose latent defects in property
that are known to the vendor notwithstanding the existence of a burden-shifting “as
is” clause or disclaimer of warranties); Wilson v. Century 21 Great W. Realty, 18 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 779, 782 (Ct. App. 1993) (holding “as is” language in realty sales contract
does not shield seller or its agent from liability for affirmative or negative fraud);
Mackintosh v. Jack Matthews & Co., 855 P.2d 549, 551 (Nev. 1993) (noting that most
states do not permit an “as is” clause to shield a seller who has fraudulently misrepre-
sented the condition of property or who has intentionally concealed known defects);
Stemple v. Dobson, 400 S.E.2d 561, 567 (W. Va. 1990) (holding “as is” clause in a real
estate sale contract will not relieve the vendor of his or her obligation to disclose a
condition that substantially affects the value or habitability of the property, is known
to the vendor but not to the purchaser, and would not be disclosed by reasonable and
diligent inspection); Richey v. Patrick, 904 P.2d 798, 803 (Wyo. 1995) (holding in the
case of an actual misrepresentation or fraud, an “as is” clause will not relieve the
seller of liability).
208. Italian Cowboy Partners, Ltd. v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 341 S.W.3d 323,
327 (Tex. 2011).
209. Id. at 327–28.
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surance Company of America, the landlord, and property manager,
Prizm Partners.210  The Secchis sought to rescind the lease and recover
damages for fraud and breach of the implied warranty of suitability.211
During lease negotiations, Fran Powell, Prizm’s management director,
told the Secchis that the restaurant building the Secchis were inter-
ested in leasing was practically new, was in perfect condition, and had
no problems whatsoever.212  When the Secchis’ general contractor in
charge of remodeling was told by another tenant that the location was
plagued with a severe odor, the Secchis confronted Powell who again
denied any problems and stated it was the “first time” she had ever
heard this information.213  The Secchis subsequently learned from the
former manager of the restaurant which previously leased the space,
that the sewer gas odor was present during their tenancy, and Powell
knew about the odor and was present on the premises when the smell
was present.214  Powell had personally characterized the odor in the
prior restaurant as “horrid,” “ungodly,” and a smell that would make
“one gag.”215  The trial court ruled in favor of the Secchis, finding
Powell had superior knowledge during the lease negotiations and
made statements of fact, known to be false when made, and the
Secchis in signing the lease relied upon those false statements.216  The
trial court further found Powell’s conduct, and attempted cover-up,
evidenced consciousness of guilt of her pre-lease misrepresenta-
tions.217  On appeal, Prudential argued the following provisions con-
tained in the Secchis’ lease negated the reliance element of the
Secchis’ claim:
14.18 Representations. Tenant acknowledges that neither Landlord
nor Landlord’s agents, employees or contractors have made any
representations or promises with respect to the Site, the Shopping
Center or this Lease except as expressly set forth herein.218
14.21 Entire Agreement. This lease constitutes the entire agreement
between the parties hereto with respect to the subject matter
hereof, and no subsequent amendment or agreement shall be bind-
ing upon either party unless it is signed by each party . . . .219
The Texas Supreme Court first noted the parties were in dispute as
to whether the lease provisions constituted a disclaimer, or simply
amounted to a merger clause, which would not disclaim reliance.220
210. Id. at 328.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Id. at 329.
214. Id. at 330.
215. Id. at 330–31.
216. Id. at 331.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 328.
219. Id. at 328, 331.
220. Id. at 333.
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Despite the parties’ contradictory recollections of what transpired, the
Court approached the issue as one of law, allowing it to determine the
legal import of the clause.221  Prudential argued the language in 14.18
constituted a disclaimer, asserting that Italian Cowboy “impliedly
agreed not to rely on any external representations by agreeing that no
external representations were made.”222  The Court disagreed, noting,
“Standard merger clauses, however, often contain language indicating
that no representations were made other than those contained in the
contract, without speaking to reliance at all.”223  After reviewing the
contractual language, the Court concluded the only reasonable inter-
pretation of the contract was that the parties “intended nothing more
than the provisions of a standard merger clause, and did not intend to
include a disclaimer of reliance on representations.”224  The court dis-
tinguished the language used from that used in two earlier cases in
which the parties expressly disclaimed reliance, explaining:
There is a significant difference between a party disclaiming its reli-
ance on certain representations, and therefore potentially relin-
quishing the right to pursue any claim for which reliance is an
element, and disclaiming the fact that no other representations were
made. In addition to differences in the contract’s language, the facts
surrounding this lease agreement differ significantly from those in
Schlumberger and Forest Oil, where we could more easily determine
that the parties intended once and for all to resolve specific dis-
putes. A lease agreement, as here, which is the initiation of a busi-
ness relationship, should be all the more clear and unequivocal in
effectively disclaiming reliance and precluding a claim for fraudu-
lent inducement, lest we “forgive intentional lies regardless of
context.”225
The Court emphasized that the term “rely” did not appear in any form
in the Italian Cowboy lease, unlike the settlement documents in
Schlumberger and Forest Oil.226  Thus, as a matter of law, the Italian
Cowboy lease did not disclaim reliance and accordingly, did not defeat
the fraudulent inducement claim.227
221. Id.
222. Id. at 334.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 335 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
226. Id. at 336.
227. The ruling here built upon, and did not disturb, principles seemingly well-set-
tled by its lower courts.  In Williams v. Dardenne, 345 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App.—Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 2011, pet granted), the Dardennes asserted that the Williamses
fraudulently concealed the condition of the house foundation by failing to disclose an
engineering letter.  The jury found in favor of the Dardennes on their fraudulent in-
ducement claim, but because the Williamses did not raise any challenge to the jury’s
findings except lack of causation and reliance, the court assumed that the Williamses’
failure to disclose the engineering letter was fraudulent—i.e., material to the transac-
tion, known to be false or misleading, and intended to induce reliance by the Darden-
nes—and would affirm the judgment if there was legally sufficient evidence that this
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Two messages, seemingly in conflict, emerge from this case:  sellers
should take care to draft disclaimer of reliance clauses, and buyers
should take care not to sign such clauses or to investigate the property
for themselves.228  This produces a state of affairs not conducive to
efficient or productive market transactions.  In fact, the opposite re-
sults: the seller will make all manner of representations—truthful,
false, varnished, and unvarnished—the value of which the buyer will
have no means to assess.  Depending upon the degree that buyer is
risk averse, she will accept, relying on seller’s representations, and
sign a contract with a disclaimer clause, or she will refuse to sign the
contract with a disclaimer clause and walk away.  Neither party gains.
A third option for the buyer is to conduct her own inspection; a
more costly proposition if, absent truthful disclosures from sellers, the
buyer does not know where to look.  Even so, the question is raised
whether the seller’s misrepresentations still matter.  In 48 HOR-
SEHILL, LLC, v. Kenro Corp.,229 the court answered yes.  There, the
plaintiff alleged a failure by defendant to disclose the existence of
harmful contamination.230  The contract provided:
ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITIONS. Purchaser shall have the
right to have the Property inspected within thirty (30) days of the
date of this Agreement for the existence of contamination by haz-
ardous substances or wastes.  In the event such inspection reveals
nondisclosure was the cause of the Dardennes’ agreement to purchase the property
“in its present condition,” notwithstanding an “as is” clause in the contract. Id. See
also Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Jefferson Assocs. Ltd, 896 S.W.2d 156, 162 (Tex.
1995) (“[A] seller cannot have it both ways: he cannot assure the buyer of the condi-
tion of a thing to obtain the buyer’s agreement to purchase ‘as is,’ and then disavow
the assurance which procured the ‘as is’ agreement;” “‘as is’ clause is not effective to
negate causation when agreement was induced by “fraudulent representation or con-
cealment of information by the seller”).  Under certain circumstances, a buyer’s inde-
pendent inspection of the property may conclusively defeat two elements of a fraud
claim: causation and reliance, if it reveals to the buyer the same information that the
seller allegedly failed to disclose. See Pairett v. Gutierrez, 969 S.W.2d 512, 517 (Tex.
App.—Austin 1998, pet. denied) (reversing summary judgment on basis of “as is”
clause when there was evidence that seller knew of home’s foundation problems but
affirmatively represented to buyer that they were not aware of any foundation
problems).
228. However, where the language of the disclaimer is clear, negotiated by knowl-
edgeable parties at arm’s length, it might be enforceable. In re Capco Energy, Inc.,
669 F.3d 274, 283 (5th Cir. 2012) (waiver-of-reliance clause negates fraudulent induce-
ment claim); Curtis Inv. Co. v. Bayerische Hypo-und Vereinsbank, AG, 341 F. App’x.
487, 491–92 (11th Cir. 2009) (holding common law fraud claims barred by merger
clause where party signs contract containing disclaimer provision and retains benefit
of contract); Stokes v. Lusker, 425 F. App’x 18 (2d Cir. 2011) (holding common law
fraud claim barred by express disclaimer of reliance); Schlumberger Tech. Corp. v.
Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 180 (Tex. 1997) (holding clear and express disclaimer of
reliance conclusively negates as a matter of law the element of reliance on representa-
tions about feasibility and value of sea diamond mining project).
229. 48 Horsehill, LLC v. Kenro Corp., No. A-2682-04T5, 2006 N.J. Super. LEXIS
707 (Jan. 17, 2006).
230. Id. at *22–24.
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the presence of any quantity of hazardous substances or wastes, the
Purchaser shall have the option to cancel this Agreement or notify
Seller in writing within thirty (30) days of the date of this Agree-
ment (time being of the essence) and provide Seller with a copy of
the report.231
The seller argued that because the buyer commissioned its own in-
spection of the property, the essential element of reliance is miss-
ing.232  That a buyer who does not look for himself is an important
factor in determining a seller’s liability,233 it still did not resolve the
question of whether the buyer relied on the results of the buyer’s own
inspection and not on the seller’s nondisclosure prior to purchase of
property containing latent defects allegedly known to the seller.234  As
the buyer claimed, the independent investigation was not only limited,
but also obscured by the seller’s supposedly intentional hiding of the
contamination under a concrete patch.235  Thus, it was of no conse-
quence that the buyer conducted its own due diligence because the
seller failed to provide all information critical to the evaluation—a
fact upon which the buyer may have justifiably relied.  In other words,
in light of the seller’s alleged concealment of trichloroethylene
(“TCE”) contamination, the buyer’s use of an outside inspection ser-
vice did not foreclose its right to pursue fraud and misrepresentation
claims at trial.236  The buyer was still entitled to rely on the fact that
sellers would not willfully conceal environmental contamination on
the property in finalizing the contract of sale.237  The buyer’s reliance
on its own physical inspection for visible damage did not mean it was
eschewing reliance on seller’s alleged willful omissions.238
V. CONTRACT LIMITS ON WHO CAN RELY
Contract clauses limiting the right to use, and hence rely upon, ser-
vices provided under the contract seem no more than an invocation of
the concept of privity.  The strict requirement of privity limits a defen-
dant’s risk exposure to foreseeable parties and events.239  This func-
tion is consistent with the theory of contract law that prevailed over
the last several centuries, that is, from contract law as morally binding
231. Id. at *25.
232. Id. at *24–25.
233. Id. at *25 (citing Golden v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 551 A.2d 1009, 1014 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1988)).
234. Id. at *25–26 (citing Byrne v. Weichert Realtors, 675 A.2d 235, 241 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996)).
235. Id. at *3–4, *34.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. See also M & D, Inc. v. McConkey, 573 N.W.2d 281, 282 (Mich. Ct. App.
1997); Williams v. Dardenne, 345 S.W.3d 118 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2011
writ denied).
239. Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 596 (Md. 2000).
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as a matter of conscience,240 to contract law as a matter of wills,241 all
obligation flowing without restraint by the government.242
In the most common context, privity means being a party.  Histori-
cally, this has meant that third parties, no matter how important the
issue or how much injury may result, had no right to enforce the con-
tract; either in obtaining prospective relief or damages.243  This was to
protect the expectations and bargains of the parties.244  The agree-
ment is crafted based upon an assessment of the parties’ needs and
expectations, as well as willingness and ability of the other party to
perform.  One English judge, Crompton J., felt that it would be “mon-
strous to allow a party to sue on a contract who could not be sued on
it.”245  Frederick Pollock stated broadly that “the agreement of con-
tracting parties could not confer any right to enforce the contract on a
third person.”246  He also insisted on the corollary of the rule, that
obligations could only be imposed on parties by their own will, or by
the law, but not by the contracts of others.247 There were disparate
views on whether third-party-beneficiaries could be in privity with the
formal parties.  Joseph Chitty argued for a rule disallowing an action
by strangers to the consideration unless one of the parties to the con-
tract could be seen as their agent.248
A. Judicial and Legislative Abrogation of Privity
The history of contract privity has not been a linear experience, but
one that has taken detours driven largely by prevailing legal theory
240. POUND, supra note 58, at 253–54.
241. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 59–97.
242. See generally Cohen, supra note 64.
243. Verosol B.V. v. Hunter Douglas, Inc., 806 F. Supp. 582, 586 (E.D. Va. 1992)
(“[A] stranger to a contract ordinarily has no rights under it and cannot sue to enforce
it or take advantage of its breach.”); Twine v. Liberty Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 311 So. 2d
299, 305 (Ala. 1975); Anderson v. First Northtown Nat’l Bank, 361 N.W.2d 116, 118
(Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
244. 13 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §37:1  (Jack K. Levin ed.,
4th ed. 2000); Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109 (1842) (denying a coachman
recovery for breach of warranty against a third party for injuries sustained as the
result of defects the coach caused by the third party.  The Court noted, “There is no
privity of contract between the parties; and if the plaintiff can sue, every passenger, or
even every person passing the coach who was injured by the upsetting coach, might
bring a similar action.  Unless we confine the operation of such contracts as this to the
parties who entered into them, the most absurd and outrageous consequences to
which I can see no limit would ensue.”).
245. 12 MICHAEL LOBBAN, THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 388
(Sir John Baker ed., Vol. XII 2010). But see Tweddle v. Atkinson, 101 E.C.L. 393
(1861); Price v. Easton, 24 E.C.L. 193 (1833) (third party unable to sue due to lack of
privity through an agency or trust relationship).
246. LOBBAN, supra note 245, at 390.
247. Id.
248. JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS, NOT
UNDER SEAL; AND UPON THE USUAL DEFENSES TO THE ACTIONS THEREON 48 (2d
ed. 1834).
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and then by larger policy concerns and evolving notions of justice and
fairness.  While a breach of warranty claim was limited to a party to
the warranty,249 a non-party’s reliance upon the negligence theory en-
abled circumvention of the privity bar.250  However, if a tort is based
on a theory of duty owed by the defendant because of the contractual
relationship, privity of contract between the parties must exist.251
In recent times, there has been a discernible trend toward altering,
if not altogether eliminating, the privity doctrine.252  One area where
there has been significant, although not universal, movement away
from the requirement of privity for legal rights is in the context of new
home construction.253  Decades ago, as part of the general movement
away from caveat emptor in cases focused on used homes, courts be-
gan to find implied warranties of workmanlike quality in new
homes.254  But, whether that warranty would run to benefit subse-
quent purchasers was an issue still in debate, although many courts
and commentators had endorsed this additional step.255  The principal
249. 18 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §52:38 (Jack K. Levin ed.,
4th ed. 2001). See also Winterbottom, 10 M. & W. 109 (1842).
250. Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
251. Blake v. John Doe 1, 623 N.E.2d 1229, 1232–33 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993).
252. P. S. ATIYAH, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF CONTRACT 265 (3d ed.
1981) (“[T]here has been a constant tendency for contractual rights to be extended in
their scope so as to affect more and more persons who cannot be regarded as parties
to the transaction.”); WILLIAM R. ANSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF CONTRACT 335
(Arthur L. Corbin ed., 3d Am. Ed. 1919) (“To many students and practitioners of the
common law privity of contract became a fetish.  As such, it operated to deprive many
a claimant of a remedy in cases where according to the mores of the time the claim
was just.”).
253. Kirk v. Ridgway, 373 N.W.2d 491, 492–93 (Iowa 1985); Speight v. Walters Dev.
Co., 744 N.W.2d 108, 114 (Iowa 2008) (holding that subsequent purchasers were enti-
tled to recover against the builder on a theory of breach of implied warranty of work-
manlike construction despite a lack of privity.  The court reasoned that it would
follow modern trend of eliminating the privity requirement in this context “to amelio-
rate the harsh doctrine of caveat emptor” and because “the [implied warranty] obliga-
tions on the part of the seller were imposed by operation of law, and did not depend
for their existence upon express agreement of the parties in privity was not neces-
sary.”); Cosmopolitan Homes, Inc., v. Weller, 663 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Colo. 1983); Rich-
ards v. Powercraft Homes, Inc., 678 P.2d 427, 427(Ariz. 1984) (holding that the
subsequent purchasers of a home may maintain actions for breach of implied war-
ranty of habitability and construction in a workmanlike manner against the home’s
builder, absent privity with the builder); see also Lofts at Fillmore Condo. Ass’n v.
Reliance Commercial Constr., Inc., 190 P.3d 733 (Ariz. 2008) (holding that contrac-
tual privity does not bar an action for breach of implied warranty of habitability and
workmanlike construction by a buyer against a homebuilder who was not also the
vendor of the residence); Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Assoc., Inc., 727 A.2d 174, 179
(R.I. 1999) (holding that subsequent purchasers could sue the builder for latent de-
fects in the home on a theory of breach of implied warranty of habitability and work-
manlike construction despite a lack of privity with the builder).
254. Richards, 678 P.2d at 429.
255. See Speight, 744 N.W.2d at 112 n.2 (Iowa 2008) (listing 19 state court decisions
allowing recovery by subsequent purchasers); see generally Sean M. O’Brien, Note,
Caveat Venditor: A Case for Granting Subsequent Purchasers a Cause of Action
Against Builder-Vendors for Latent Defects in the Home, 20 J. CORP. L. 525, 527, 530
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doctrinal objection to affording subsequent purchasers the same pro-
tection as new-home purchasers was the lack of contractual privity.256
Many courts recognized, however, that the implied-warranty obliga-
tion is one imposed by operation of law and257 that “it is a judicial
creation and does not, in itself, arise from the language of any contract
between the builder-vendor and the original purchaser.”258  This
means that no principle of contract law should bar recovery by a re-
mote purchaser.259  Courts have pointed out the subsequent purchaser
stands in the same position as the original purchaser—with no more
opportunity to examine the builder’s methods and standards and
must, to the same extent, rely on the builder-vendor’s knowledge and
experience.260  The thinking is that the “mere fortuity of an interven-
ing owner—often . . . for only a short time—provides no basis for
denying a home buyer the protection afforded by the implied war-
ranty of good workmanship.”261  The most “practical objection to ex-
(1995) (observing that the “increasing trend is to recognize a cause of action for sub-
sequent home buyers” and that predicating recovery “on whether the plaintiff was the
original or subsequent purchaser . . . is unjust and illogical”); Linda M. Libertucci,
Comment, Builder’s Liability to New and Subsequent Purchasers, 20 SW. U. L. REV.
219, 228 (1991) (noting that the “current trend” is to extend implied warranty protec-
tion to subsequent purchasers and concluding that “[p]ublic policy demands that
builder-vendors be held liable to both new and subsequent purchasers for hidden de-
fects in housing”).
256. See, e.g., Richards, 678 P.2d at 427; Lofts at Fillmore Condo. Ass’n , Inc., 190
P.3d  at 733.
257. See O’Brien v. Comstock Foods, Inc., 212 A.2d 69, 70–71 (Vt. 1965) (explain-
ing that implied warrant of merchantability is “imposed by law . . . apart from consid-
erations entirely contractual” and thus rejecting “illogic and injustice” of applying
contractual privity to restrict liability); Terlinde v. Neely, 271 S.E.2d 768, 769 (S.C.
1980) (“Extension of implied warranties to subsequent purchasers is based upon
sound legal and policy considerations.”); Barnes v. Mac Brown & Co., Inc., 342
N.E.2d 619, 620 (Ind. 1976) (public policy compels a change in the law); Redarowicz
v. Ohlendorf, 441 N.E.2d 324, 330 (Ill. 1982) (“The warranty of habitability is creature
of public policy.”); George v. Veach, 313 S.E.2d 920, 922 (N.C. 1984) (“An implied
warranty arises by operation of law.”).
258. Speight, 744 N.W.2d at 114.
259. Id.  The Illinois Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion, observing that,
while the implied warranty just begs the question of liability to a third-party for inju-
ries sustained as the result of defects, the warranty was created to protect home pur-
chasers, and “exists independently,” and thus “[p]rivity of contract is not required.”
Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 330.
260. Long Trail House Condo. Ass’n v. Engelberth Const., Inc., 59 A.3d 752, 765
(Vt. 2012).
261. Id. at 765 (citing Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 330, for the proposition that “the
compelling public policies underlying the implied warranty of habitability should not
be frustrated because of the short intervening ownership of the first purchaser.”);
Speight, 744 N.W.2d at 114 (“[T]he public policy justifications supporting our decision
to recede from the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of new homes by builder-
vendors equally apply to the sale of used homes to subsequent purchasers.”); Lempke
v. Dagenais, 547 A.2d 290, 294 (N.H. 1988) (“The mitigation of caveat emptor should
not be frustrated by the intervening ownership of the prior purchasers.”); Aronsohn v.
Mandara, 484 A.2d 675, 680 (N.J. 1984) (“The contractor should not be relieved of
liability for unworkmanlike construction simply because of the fortuity that the prop-
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tending implied-warranty protection to a subsequent owner is the
concern that it might expand the risks for builder-vendors beyond
those for which they contracted, and ultimately increase the costs of
construction.”262  This objection is unfounded because “[t]he builder
already owes a duty to construct the home in a workmanlike manner
. . . extension to a subsequent purchaser, within a reasonable time, will
not change this basic obligation.”263  As the Illinois Supreme Court
has observed, “[w]e are an increasingly mobile people” and a builder-
vendor should therefore “know that a house he builds might be resold
within a relatively short period of time and should not expect that the
warranty will be limited by the number of days that the original owner
chooses to hold onto the property.”264  Most courts, however, have
limited a builder-vendor’s exposure by requiring that claims for latent
defects be brought within a reasonable period after completion of the
construction.265
erty on which he did the construction has changed hands.”); Terlinde, 271 S.E.2d at
770 (holding that “[t]he only logical application of the principles” underlying the im-
plied warranty of workmanship requires a holding that it “extends to subsequent
home purchasers for a reasonable amount of time”); Sewell v. Gregory, 371 S.E.2d 82,
85–86 (W. Va. 1988) (holding that all of the reasons for recognizing an implied war-
ranty of workmanship in the sale of a new home “apply with equal strength to used
homes”); Moxley v. Laramie Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 733, 736 (Wyo. 1979) (“[A]ny
reasoning which would arbitrarily interpose a first buyer as an obstruction to someone
equally as deserving of recovery is incomprehensible.”).
262. Long Trail, 59 A.3d at 765.
263. Id. at 765 (citing Lempke, 547 A.2d at 295); see also Speight, 744 N.W.2d at 114
(“The builder-vendor’s risk is not increased by allowing subsequent purchasers to re-
cover for the same latent defects for which an original purchaser could recover.”);
Keyes v. Guy Bailey Homes, Inc., 439 So. 2d 670, 673 (Miss. 1983) (reasoning that
builder “already owes a duty to construct the home in a workmanlike manner” so that
extension of liability to subsequent home purchaser will require “no greater effort
[by] . . . the builder to protect himself”); Nichols v. R.R. Beaufort & Assoc., Inc., 727
A.2d 174, 180 (R.I. 1999) (“[A]llowing subsequent owners to maintain a similar cause
of action . . . will not drastically enlarge this basic obligation of the home builder.”).
“The risk is also clearly one that builder-vendors should foresee.” Long Trail, 59 A.3d
at 765.
264. Redarowicz, 441 N.E.2d at 331.
265. See, e.g., Lempke, 547 A.2d at 297 (“The implied warranty of workmanlike
quality for latent defects is limited to a reasonable period of time.”); Nichols, 727
A.2d at 181–82 (holding that, to avoid unlimited exposure, “we restrict the coverage
of the implied warranties . . . to those latent defects that subsequent owners discover
within a reasonable period of time after these home contractors have substantially
completed their work”); Terlinde, 271 S.E.2d at 769 (“The length of time for latent
defects to surface . . . should be controlled by the standard of reasonableness.”);
Moxley, 600 P.2d at 736 (holding that a home builder’s implied warranty “extends to
subsequent purchasers for a reasonable length of time”).  The same rule applies in
Vermont for initial homebuyers, and would apply with equal force to subsequent pur-
chasers. See Heath v. Palmer, 915 A.2d 1290, 1293 (Vt. 2006) (“[T]he general rule is
that the duration of the implied warranty of habitability and good workmanship is
determined by a ‘standard of reasonableness.’”).
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1. Foreseeability as a Proxy for Privity
The most compelling basis for allowing non-parties an action
against a party to a contract seems to be the substitution of foresee-
ability in place of privity.  In this way, when no contractual privity
exists, courts will recognize a duty of care to a third party who suf-
fered an economic loss and when the contracting parties intend to
confer a benefit on the third party.266  Some courts have recognized a
duty of care to a non-contracting third party when the defendant has
knowledge that the third party would rely on the defendant’s work.267
A plaintiff asserting a non-party claim must show that he or she is a
part of a class specifically intended to be the beneficiaries of the con-
tract.268  The scenarios where such situations might arise include title
searches, surveys, housing inspections, and appraisers.269
Some state statutes have eliminated the requirement of privity alto-
gether.270  The Mississippi Code provides that “[i]n all causes of action
for personal injury or property damage or economic loss brought on
account of negligence, strict liability or breach of warranty . . . , privity
shall not be a requirement to maintain said action.”271  In Touche
Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Insurance Co., the Mississippi Su-
preme Court addressed the relevance of privity where the issue was
identified as whether an “independent auditor [is] liable to a third
party, who, though lacking privity, relies to his detriment on financial
statements negligently prepared.”272  The court answered in the af-
firmative, stating:
[A]n independent auditor is liable to reasonably foreseeable users
of the audit, who request and receive a financial statement from the
audited entity for a proper business purpose, and who then detri-
mentally rely on the financial statement, suffering a loss, proxi-
mately caused by the auditor’s negligence.  Such a rule protects
third parties, who request, receive and rely on a financial statement,
while it also protects the auditor from an unlimited number of po-
266. Shofer v. Stuart Hack Co., 723 A.2d 481, 487 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1999).
267. See, e.g., Walpert, Smullian & Blumenthal, P.A. v. Katz, 762 A.2d 582, 594
(Md. 2000). In Walpert, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held an accountant liable
for economic losses suffered by the third-party plaintiffs because the plaintiffs met
face-to-face with the accountant and told him that they were relying on his audit. Id.
268. Shofer, 723 A.2d at 487.
269. See infra discussion accompanying notes 279 to 306.
270. See VA. CODE ANN. § 8.2-318 (West 2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-34-104
(West 2013); see generally, R.D. Hursh, Privity of Contract as Essential to Recovery in
Action Based on the Theory Other Than Negligence, Against Manufacturer or Seller of
Product, Alleged to Have Caused Injury, 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
271. MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (West 1976).
272. Touche Ross & Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 514 So. 2d 315, 318 (Miss.
1987).
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tential users, who may otherwise read the financial statement, once
published.273
The Mississippi Supreme Court later clarified this rule in Hosford v.
McKissack, a case involving duties of care in performing another kind
of professional service.274  There, a real estate company hired a ter-
mite-inspection company.275  Later, the real estate company sold the
home and notified the buyer that the pest control company’s report
stated the home was free of termites.276  After learning the report was
erroneous, the buyer sued the pest control company for negligent mis-
representation.277  The trial court cited Touche Ross and dismissed the
buyer’s claims on summary judgment, reasoning that the buyer
“lacked privity” and was “outside the circle of foreseeability.”278  The
Mississippi Supreme Court then reversed.279  First, the Court noted
Mississippi had eliminated the privity requirement by statute.280  Sec-
ond, arguably broadening the Touche Ross rule, the Court held “while
those who request and receive an audit report or a termite inspection
report may be within the ambit of the defendant’s duty, it does not
follow on principle that those who do not formally request the report
of and from its maker are excluded.”281  The liability is “to reasonably
foreseeable users,” not just to those who request the work.282
273. Id. at 322–23. See also Credit Alliance Corp. v. Arthur Andersen, 483 N.E.2d
110, 118 (N.Y. 1985) (for determining whether a “near privity” relationship is present:
(1) the defendant must have been aware that its representation would be used for a
particular purpose; (2) the defendant must have intended that a known party or par-
ties would rely thereon in furtherance of that purpose; and (3) there must have been
some conduct on the part of the defendant linking it to that party or parties’ reliance);
Gould v. Winstar Commc’ns, Inc., 692 F.3d 148 (2d Cir. 2012) (where shareholders
could not evidence reliance upon auditor’s representation, or that auditor acted with
scienter, no recovery was permitted against the auditor); Eldred v. McGladrey, 468
N.W.2d 218, 220 (Iowa 1991) (Where plaintiff-investor’s only established inferred reli-
ance on auditor’s representations, there could be no recovery against the accounting
firm on negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, holding that “while we have re-
jected the requirement of privity, we share his concern that accountants should not be
exposed to ‘a liability in an indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an
indeterminate class.’”  There must be some direct reliance on the representation in
order for the investor to recover).  In AUSA Life Ins. Co. v. Ernst & Young, 206 F.3d
202, 222–23 (2d Cir. 2000), the Court of Appeals reversed the district court’s finding
that there was a lack of privity between plaintiff-investors and a corporation’s inde-
pendent auditor under Section 10-b of the Securities Exchange Act, because the audi-
tor did know that plaintiffs would rely on their reports thereby satisfying the “near
privity” test from Credit Alliance.  On remand, the lower court was instructed to make
a determination as to the fraud claims alleged by plaintiffs, in light of this privity
determination.
274. Hosford v. McKissack, 589 So. 2d 108 (Miss. 1991).
275. Id. at 109.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 110.
278. Id. at 110–11.
279. Id. at 112.
280. Id. at 110. See also MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-7-20 (1975).
281. Hosford, 589 So. 2d at 111.
282. Id. at 110.
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In Paul v. Landsafe Flood Determination Inc., the Fifth Circuit ad-
dressed the issue of a surveyor’s liability to a homeowner who suf-
fered damage to a home located in a flood zone.283  Apparently, the
surveyor, hired by the lender to make a flood area determination, in-
correctly stated the home was not in a flood zone.284  The borrower
did not obtain flood insurance.285  When Hurricane Katrina struck,
the home suffered substantial damages.286  The borrower sued the sur-
veyor under Mississippi law.287  The surveyor defended on the
grounds of absence of privity.288  The Fifth Circuit found that Missis-
sippi had abolished the privity requirement289 and instead, foresee-
ability had been substituted.290
The court explained that, as with the Hosford pest control report,
this flood-zone determination was made for a specific transaction.291
Yet, the concern about flooding was no different from that about
pests, both threatened injury to the value and use of the property.292
Even though there was no privity with Landsafe since the flood-zone
report was not prepared specifically for the property owner,293 what
was important was that it was reasonably foreseeable that the prop-
erty owner would receive and rely on Landsafe’s report in deciding
whether to go forward with the purchase.294 While the analysis might
be different depending on whether flood insurance was required by
the mortgage, the circumstances here were enough to hold that “the
erroneous flood-zone determination was the kind of professional
opinion, developed in the course of a party’s business and supplied for
the guidance of others in a transaction, on which justifiable and detri-
mental reliance by a reasonably foreseeable person might be shown to
have occurred.”295  As foreseeability was the key to liability, Landsafe
could not limit its liability by placing a disclaimer on its flood-zone
283. Paul v. Landsafe Flood Determination, Inc., 550 F.3d 511, 513 (5th Cir. 2008).
284. Id. at 512.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 512–13.
288. Id. at 515–16.
289. Id. at 516.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id.  The court continued on to reject Landsafe’s argument to adopt the narrow
view expressed in Audler v. CBC Innovis, Inc., 519 F.3d 239, 250–51 (5th Cir. 2008)
(holding expert hired by lender to make flood control determination had owed no
duty to property owner, nor was the owner an intended beneficiary).  For a broader
overview of the issues in Audler, see Landsafe, 550 F.3d at 516–17. See generally Del-
gado v. Kornegay, 395 N.Y.S.2d 126 (Sup. Ct. 1977) (where a purchaser of a home
relied on an inspection report ordered by the seller stating there was no evidence of
termite infestation or damage—purchaser brought an action against the inspector.
The court held the inspector could be liable to the purchaser as a third-party benefici-
ary where the inspector knew the property was in the process of being sold).
295. Landsafe, 550 F.3d at 518.
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determination provided to the lender pursuant to the Flood Disaster
Protection Act that it should not be used for any other purpose.296
In case of real-property appraisers, there seems to be a decided,
although slow, trend in favor of making the appraisers liable to home
buyers for defective appraisals, even though the lenders, for purposes
of complying with their underwriting standards, typically hire the ap-
praisers.297  There appears to continue to be two schools of thought on
the liability of title abstracters to parties who did not order the title
search, but who nonetheless rely on the report.298  In Williams v. Pol-
gar, after an exhaustive study of how courts around the country
treated the issue, the Michigan Supreme Court adopted the rule that
title abstractors can be liable to parties who reasonably rely upon ab-
stracts, where that reliance was reasonably foreseeable by the
abstractor.299
VI. THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: INTUITION AND PUBLIC POLICY
The Author has attempted to show that the rules governing market
relations have not been static.  Instead, they have been shaped and
urged by a host of ends—social ordering, economic prosperity, and
most recently, conscience.  Trying to discern, then summon up, the
conscience of market actors may be fruitless if the actors lack any
moral compass or sympathetic moorings. Conscience, like morality, is
often thought an individualistic notion, determined by a myriad of
psychological and cultural factors.300  Even if we find it appropriate to
make open references to conscience to determine duties and liabili-
ties, whose conscience should be the standard—that of the judges, ac-
296. Id. at 518–19. See also Tartera v. Palumbo, 453 S.W.2d 780 (Tenn. 1970) (hold-
ing a lack of privity between a surveyor and injured plaintiff by the surveyor’s negli-
gent performance to provide an accurate survey will not relieve the surveyor of
liability where it was known or foreseeable that the plaintiff would rely on the results
of the survey).
297. See Shelby D. Green, Re-appraising the Appraisers: Expanding Liability to
Buyers and Borrowers in the Story of the 2008 Financing Industry Crisis, 25 PROB. &
PROP. 11 (2011).
298. First Am. Title Ins. Co. v. First Title Serv. Co. of the Fla. Keys, 457 So. 2d 467,
470 (Fla. 1984) (holding that contractual privity is required) (abstracters cannot be
liable); Williams v. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d 149, 150 (Mich. 1974) (abstracters may be
liable).
299. Polgar, 215 N.W.2d at 11–18.  The court found the common law rule requiring
privity to hold an abstracter liable arose at a time when “abstracts would be used by
real estate owners.” Id. at 11–12.  But as time progressed, the class of people relying
on abstracts expanded and the abstracter’s liability accordingly was extended to par-
ties the abstracter knew would rely. Id. at 14.  Finding the privity requirement so
riddled with exceptions, this court could not find a principled basis for not eliminating
it in the case of parties who foreseeably would rely upon the abstract. Id. at 16–17.
This group would include grantees, where the grantor has initiated a contract for ab-
stracting services. Id. at 23.
300. See Laura S. Underkuffler, Individual Conscience and the Law, 42 DEPAUL L.
REV. 93, 94–96 (1992).
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cording to religious precepts or natural law?  But we need not trouble
ourselves too much with this issue, for there is a conscience that is
readily perceived that operates at all times and can be fairly imposed
on actors in the marketplace.  It is the law’s conscience as revealed in
a kind of morality—a normative idea that can exist alongside that of
contract autonomy.
A. Conscience as an Imperative for Moral Markets
The free-market mantra—that market actors are cold-hearted, nar-
rowly pursuing their self-interest, and efficient markets must be free
from government restraint, operating according to their own values—
is being contested.  Recently,301 a group of scholars, law professors,
economists, anthropologists, cognitive scientists, neuroscientists, polit-
ical scientists, primatologists, and philosophers302 came together to ex-
plore the claim that a range of non-economic values are yet reflected
in markets, and to consider the effects of markets on human wel-
fare.303 They strived to show that the view of markets as defined and
driven solely by selfish competition, so often attributed to Adam
Smith, is a misconception.304 There was an opening for this discussion
inasmuch as the question whether markets and market participants
might be inherently immoral had not been confirmed, nor was there
solid evidence to substantiate it.305 To the contrary, the authors
believed:
[m]arkets are moral in two senses. Moral behavior is necessary for
exchange in moderately regulated markets, for example, to reduce
cheating without exorbitant transactions costs. Market exchange it-
self can also lead to an understanding of fair exchange and in this
way build social capital in non-market settings. Research has shown
that the values that create social capital are a potent stimulus for
economic development.306
Debunking the common conception of a market characterized by cu-
pidity, they show instead a kind of morality operating and that the
very freedom to exchange in markets celebrates individual dignity and
choice.307
301. Michael C. Jensen, Foreword to MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF
VALUES IN THE ECONOMY (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
302. Paul J. Zak, Introduction to MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VAL-
UES IN THE ECONOMY xvi (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).
303. Id. at x.
304. Id. at xi.
305. Id. at xv–xvi.
306. Id. at xvii (citing Paul J. Zak & Stephen Knack, Trust and Growth, 111 ECON.
J. 295, 295 (2001)).
307. Id. at xvii.
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Professor Lynn Stout addressed head on the issue of conscience in
market transactions.308  The seller who knowingly makes false state-
ments about a property he seeks to sell, then seeks to shield himself
from liability through a disclaimer clause, might be defined as “homo
economicus,” a member of that “mythical species” of rational maxi-
mizers.309  Depending on one’s perspective, “homo economicus”
could be viewed as a sociopath, “the hallmark [of which is] extreme
selfishness as shown by a willingness ‘to lie, cheat, take advantage,
[and] exploit.’”310  But, there is a plethora of studies that show that
self-interest is not the only driver of behavior in market transactions;
most people routinely act to consider the welfare of others.311  In the
end, Stout maintains there is an over-emphasis in the literature on
selfish behavior, and that we should stop to see that:
[i]f conscience is indeed an omnipresent and powerful force, and if
we can find some way to use it deliberately to change human behav-
ior, it may offer enormous leverage in any quest to promote a bet-
ter, more just, and more productive society. Before we can hope to
employ the force of conscience, however, we must first understand
it. Before we can understand conscience, we must first recognize it
exists and take it seriously as a source of human behavior.312
While Stout’s suggestion to make efforts to perceive and invoke the
conscience of individual actors should be taken seriously, there is yet
the law’s conscience that can be invoked, to address economically and
socially unwholesome and exploitative conduct.313  The law’s con-
science can be viewed as an imperative “embedded in the law, greater
than the temporal responses of mere judges . . . .”314  It is “[a] com-
punction [that] underlies the whole spectrum of the common
law . . . .”315  In essence, “[i]t is the law’s ultimate abhorrence of ex-
308. Lynn Stout, Taking Conscience Seriously, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL
ROLE OF VALUES IN THE ECONOMY 157 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008).  Nobel Prize winners
James Buchanan and Gary Becker have been leading the study of “rational choice” as
applied to explain a host of phenomena, including crime, education, corporate gov-
ernance, and even law-makers.  The law and economics legal studies movement em-
braces the idea of selfish rationality to legal rules and institutions. Id. at 158.
309. Id.
310. Id. at 158–59 (quoting BENJAMIN WOLMAN, THE SOCIOPATHIC PERSONALITY
42 (1987)).  Under the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual of Mental Disorders, Homo Economicus could be said to have anti-social
personality disorder, where he exhibits behaviors such as “failure to conform to social
norms with respect to lawful behaviors,” engage in deceit or conning others for per-
sonal profit or pleasure and lack of remorse having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from
another. Id. at 159 (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2000)).
311. Id. at 160.
312. Id. at 170.
313. See Justice E.W. Thomas, The Conscience of the Law, 8 WAIKATO L. REV. 1, 3
(2000) (N.Z.).
314. Id.
315. Id.
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ploitation: no person may exploit another in the sense of taking or
obtaining an unfair advantage at the other’s expense.”316  This con-
science precludes exploitation.317  The Honorable Justice Thomas uses
the word exploitation to mean unfair imposition upon another;318 and
states that exploitation is wrong because the law presumes that each
of us is equally deserving of respect in such regard as confirms our
humanity.319
The moral overtones of conscience are undeniable, but this is no
ground to repudiate its necessity, existence, or legitimacy.  When it
operates, conscience does so to reflect and impose upon actors the
expectations of the community as to what is fundamentally required in
human relations.320  Though perhaps not born at the same time as law,
but certainly matured alongside and in response to it, the law’s con-
science has served to efface the seemingly absurd and surely harsh
aspects of law.321  It became essential when society’s prevailing philo-
sophical precepts embraced freedom of choice and freedom of ac-
tion.322  That idea provided the predicate for an economic regime in
which freedom of choice was endemic and capitalism became the in-
evitable economic order.323  From the laissez-faire economies of the
19th century, through the regulated or mixed economies of the mid-
20th century, to the free market and global economies of today, free-
dom from interference has been and remains a fundamental premise.
The belief is that efficient and competitive markets require freedom
from exogenous governmental interference.324  Thus unconstrained
without external checks, where the prevailing philosophy is “every
man for himself and the devil take the hindmost,”325 laissez-faire can
lead to a brutish, Hobbesian world where one with either political or
economic power is wont and does exploit the one without.  Where this
does occur, the law’s conscience steps in to curtail individual freedom,
where that exercise is exploitative.  The conscience of the law operates
as a bulwark to safeguard the autonomy and dignity of the less power-
ful and may be interposed, in a measured way, to correct wrongful
conduct in contract relations.326 But it should not be invoked merely
to assist those who enter into an imprudent or improvident deal.327
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. n.8.
319. Id. at 4.
320. Id.
321. James Barr Ames, Law & Morals, 22 HARV. L. REV. 97, 102 (1908) (discussing
early common law failure to see the moral quality in self-defense and that the law
exposed a debtor who omitted to obtain a written discharge, to paying twice).
322. Thomas, supra note 313, at 5.
323. Id. at 6. See discussion, supra Part II(A).
324. Id. at 6.
325. HOBSBAWM, supra note 27, at 200.
326. Id. at 15 (quoting Bridge v. Campbell Discount Co., AC 600, 626 (1962)).
327. Id.
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This means that when the parties have entered into a contract open-
eyed to all that can be observed, that bargain struck has the force of
law.328  On the other hand, when a party, with eyes wide open, enters
into negotiations but then is told not to look because there is nothing
untoward to be found, and in fact there are troubling discoveries, this
is a case for the law to intervene.
B. Inefficiencies and Externalities
The dialogue on the role and virtues of self-interest in market trans-
actions is as long-standing as there are markets.329  Proponents of self-
interested free markets recognize the seeming conflict between tradi-
tional moral advice, on the one hand, and egoism and greed on the
other but assert that institutional interventions act to mediate these
two ends in such a way that self-interest deserves moral endorse-
ment.330  To be sure, no one has argued for a market characterized
solely by dishonest and fraudulent practices, or one wholly devoid of
scruples, as all right-thinking honest people seem to agree that few
societies leave the market to operate wholly without constraints.331
Individualism or self-interest, where allowed to run loose without
bounds, will eventually prove destructive of individuals and society.
Indeed, over the centuries, we have seen market freedoms limited for
moral or sentimental reasons.332
A market without morals cannot be squared with accepted eco-
nomic models. Not only are there no gains in efficiency, but the costs
are great—buyers pay too much and wealth is decreased, not maxi-
mized, because of the inability to obtain value from the property ac-
quired; ex-post resolution of claims burdens the judicial system; and
demoralization is high.  Significantly, the absence of trust in market
relations is most inefficient as it produces wasted time and resources
gathering information and investigating that which would otherwise
be avoided if the one party spoke truthfully and the other believed
that party.333
328. Id. (citing Robert L. Hale, Bargaining, Duress, and Economic Liberty, 43
COLUM. L. REV. 603, 604 (1943)).
329. FINN, supra note 14, at 53.
330. Id.
331. See Kennedy, supra note 65, at 141–44; see also John F. Henry, The Ideology of
the Laissez Faire Program, 42 J ECO. ISSUES 209, 210 (2008); Joseph Stiglitz, Distin-
guished Lecture on Economics in Government: The Private Uses of Public Interest:
Incentives and Institutions, 12 J. ECO. PERSP. 3, 3–4 (1998).
332. Kennedy, supra note 65, at 141–44.
333. See KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974) (describing
the value of “trust as an important lubricant of a social system . . . extremely efficient
. . . [saving] a lot of trouble to have a fair degree of reliance on other people’s word.”).
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C. The Call of Public Policy
Well-defined public policy informs conscience and provides the rel-
evant standards.  Examples include the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing;334 the unenforceability of unconscionable contracts;
and the invalidity of contracts that purport to exculpate from liability
for intentional wrongdoing.335  Professor Walter Gellhorn found the
reasons for condemning such arrangements as grounded in public
policy.336
From early times Anglo-American courts have refused to enforce
illegal contracts, that is, those that are ‘opposed to public policy,’ . . .
[whether it was the case that] the contract bore an element of crimi-
nality . . . a step in the commission of the crime (either by way of
making its commission possible or by way of enjoying its fruits), [or]
where the contract was merely shocking to the sense of justice and
of the fitness of things . . . . [The courts,] as representing the com-
munity conscience, declared that such contracts should not be exe-
cuted with the court’s assistance, . . . to assist in their enforcement
. . . would be to encourage conduct which was inimical to the public
welfare.337
This call for conscience in transactions is not a call for the highest
moral values, either stemming from religious or secular influences, but
for those most people agree upon—truthfulness and honesty.
1. New Framework for Disclaimer-of-Reliance Clauses
The threat to public welfare is equally great by the growing use of
disclaimer-of-reliance clauses in property transactions for wrongful
ends.  What seems to be in order is a new idea, or public policy, on
such disclaimer-of-reliance clauses, something on the order that
follows:
334. Stout, supra note 308, at 186.
335. GRACE MCLANE GISEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS: CONTRACTS CONTRARY TO
PUBLIC POLICY § 85.18, at 455–71 (2003), LEXIS 15–85 Corbin on Contracts § 85.18
(“The general rule of exculpatory agreements is that a party may agree to exempt
another party from tort liability if that tort liability results from ordinary negligence.
Courts do not enforce agreements to exempt parties from tort liability if the liability
results from that party’s own gross negligence, recklessness, or intentional conduct.”).
336. See Walter Gellhorn, Contracts and Public Policy, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 679, 679
(1935).
337. Id.  Professor Gellhorn discussed the conundrum that courts face when a deci-
sion declining to enforce a contract, illegal under a statute, might be harmful to a
party who did not knowingly agree to break the law.  In finding the public policy on
which a decision to enforce or not is made, Professor Gellhorn explains that judges’
decision is not made on an “unassisted judgment of what is naturally and inherently
just and right between man and man,” but “upon authoritative legislative pronounce-
ment and upon intelligent effort to procure informative data,” as it relates to judg-
ments formulated by constitutions, statutes, and prior judicial and non-judicial
investigations. Id. at 695.
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Judicial Attitude
○ As a matter of course, the court should view such clauses with
suspicion.
» Disclaimer-of-reliance and merger clauses are not inherently
evil.  Indeed, the laudable purposes are several: they serve to
define and delineate the terms of the parties’ deal, causing
the parties to think about what has transpired between them;
they serve to provide concrete evidence and thus further in-
terests in judicial economy where proof of the terms of the
agreement are memorialized in one document and does not
rest upon after-bargain oral claims.
» However, these otherwise neutral and rational contracting
tools have been employed perniciously—as tricks and de-
vices for fraud.
○ An anti-disclaimer orientation will result not only in more hon-
est transactions, but will also yield efficiency gains.
» The parties will engage in ex-ante conduct calculated toward
addressing the newly re-allocated burdens.
» While ex-ante transactions costs may be expected to rise, the
shift in attitude may lead to decreased ex-post transaction
costs—losses from the inability to use the property as
planned, liability for injuries to third parties, and litigation
expenses.
Integration and Truthfulness.
○ The party invoking the protections of a merger or disclaimer-of-
reliance clause must make a convincing showing of
completeness.
» There must be a clause that he has made no representations
regarding the property that was not memorialized in the
written agreement and that assertion must be true.
» It will be incumbent upon buyers then to carefully read the
written instrument before signing.
» While paradoxically, this requirement would require a re-
counting of all matters discussed in order to invoke the
merger doctrine, that listing would preclude the introduction
of extraneous and/or parol representations and terms.  As
such, it would not offend the parol evidence rule.
» The requirement might prompt some sellers to decide to pro-
vide no information, and where there is no duty to disclose,
the costs of information gathering may be higher and will
shift to buyer.
Representation to Offset Disclaimer.
○ All disclaimer-of-reliance clauses must be complemented by a
representation of truthfulness.
» There must be a clause containing representations and war-
ranties by the one party that he or she has not intentionally
withheld or misrepresented any fact about the quality or con-
dition of the property material to the transaction.
» This will cause the other to identify all types of information
that may be material to the deal and lead to some assessment
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of the relative costs of gathering it as the parties commence
bargaining.  In this way, the requirement will prevent the
fraudulent and/or abusive use of disclaimer-of-reliance
clauses.
» To the extent that this requirement causes the parties to deal
more at arm’s length, there may be some losses of those val-
ues inherent in a more trusting relationship.
Penalty Default.
○ The requirement of an off-setting representation is an immuta-
ble rule that cannot be contracted away.
» This component serves to address the asymmetry of informa-
tion, prompting a party with superior knowledge to reveal,
honestly and completely, material information to the other
party as necessary and avoiding inefficient strategic rent-
seeking behavior by the withholding of information.
» While it does constrain some individual freedom, to allow a
party to make false representations on which another relies
to his injury would deny the other party’s status as a free-
choosing and rational actor.
Reliance by Third Parties.
○ Disclaimer-of-reliance clauses cannot purport to limit liability to
third-parties who foreseeably rely on the representations in the
contract.
» Foreseeability should be determined by an assessment of all
relevant factors, including the expressed intentions about the
future use and disposition of the property and the common
applications of the property.
» Some accounting for attenuation by time and use by the orig-
inal and third parties must be made.
This approach is a new idea, just as the rule requiring disclosure
was.  It will be tested by the challenges that all new ideas face.  They
become normative through a process that first perceives the existing
regime or rules as having failed, then searches for new ones that seem
logical, fair, just, and now more than ever, efficient.  Once the new
idea is laid down, it must be scrupulously applied.  Yet, in order for
this new idea or policy to be successful, it must prove its viability—
economic, administrative, social, and political—by showing that it is
efficient, facile, efficacious, and productive.
VII. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused on the need for the law’s intervention in
contract relations as it relates to the use of disclaimer-of-reliance
clauses, in order to bring this practice in line with current notions of
honesty and fair play.  This intervention best can be achieved through
a prescribed protocol, which places the burdens of disclosure on the
party best able to do so, while requiring the party also to be circum-
spect in the relation.  The use of disclaimer-of-reliance clauses as they
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are increasingly being used in the cases discussed here is incompatible
with efficient market transactions.  The uncounted negative externali-
ties from such conduct can not be confined to the parties, but radiates
into society—buyers face financial ruin from an unproductive prop-
erty and third parties injury from dangerous conditions on the prop-
erty.  These circumstances occur not just because of information
asymmetry, but because of strategic, rent-seeking conduct calculated
to shroud or obscure from the other party the relevant facts.  After-
the-fact remedies proving less effective than prophylactic rules, it be-
comes essential that courts and legislatures intervene to impose new
standards in bargaining.  Absent intervention, through disclaimer-of-
reliance clauses, caveat emptor may be revived.  Our collective and
evolving notions of efficiency, free will, and reason must be invoked to
prevent retrenchment.
